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5. 
I. Introduction 
This thesis is a study of the change in composition of a 
list of the 150 largest non-financial corporations in the United States 
from 1909 to 1949. It is intended primarily as a pilot study and in-
dicates what might be accomplished in a longer project. 
A. The Problem 
1. Competition 
This study should be interpreted as casting only weak and 
indirect light on the extent of competition in our economy. 
In the first place, only the 150 largest corporations at any 
one time have been observed, and no reference has been made to their 
relationship ~dth the thousands of other firms operating in the economy. 
Should we attempt to determine the extent of competition by 
observing the largest corporations, even if we relate them to the size 
of other corporations, we thus imply that the prime measure of competi-
tion is size. Professor Chamberlin* has pointed out the possibility 
of the lack of competition in the instance of many small firms which 
have differentiated their respective products. Other writers have 
observed that there are other, possibly more significant, criteria of 
competition than sheer size of a particular firm.~~~ Thus we must look 
for some other justification of this study. 
'*1, pp. 81-100 
*";:H3, and 9 • 
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2. The Effect of the Dynamic Economy on the Giant Corporations. 
One of the prime characteristics of our growing economy has 
been innovation~;., i.e. the introduction of the nevr product, the new 
method of production, the ne« market or outlet for product, the new 
business form, and the nevv source of raw material supply. These inno-
vations have been portrayed by Professor Schumpeter as the prime lever 
of the capitalist econo~}. Through the operation of this force, it 
is contended, the position of the large corporation may be subject to 
challenge by nev1 firms who will, by innovating, encroach upon the 
position of the old firms. These nevv firms may themselves become 
large, and eventually give way to some newer firm which possesses yet 
another innovation*>PA-. This process has been called Creative Destruc-
tion~~-~-. If this is truly how the economy operates, we may expect 
the composition of the 150 largest corporations to vary over time. On 
the other hand, because of the corporate form, it is possible that 
corporations may maintain their position through a process of innovating 
within themselves. This is one aspect of what has been called Trusti-
fied Capitalis~~~~}. Hawever, this particular study has not been 
designed to measure such internal innovation although this undoubtedly 
needs to be done. 
~:·2, p. 84. 
~-~ 2, pp. 87-123, or for a condensed version, see 3, pp. 9-21. 
~H~}r 2 , p • 134 • 
~J,:~~~ 7, PP• 81-86 and 3, pp. 63-64. 
*'-HHHf 2, p. 96, and 3, pp. 40-41. For the thoughts of one who 
believes that Trustified Capitalism is dominant, see 4. 
7· 
However, we can crudely test the Schumpeterian hypothesis 
of innovation by observing the composition and behavior of the 1)0 
largest corporations over a forty-year span. 
B. Other Studies. 
There have been very few studies which have utilized the 
same method of approach as does this study. Those studies r..a ve been 
based on the work of Berle and Means in their book The Modern Corpor-
ation and Private Property->~. Therefore it is fitting that we examine 
the portion of their work which is relevant to the current study. 
Berle and Means observed the 200 largest non-financial corpor-
ations from 1919 to 1929. The only listing of these corporations to be 
found in their book is for 1930-l*• Hmmver, reference is frequently 
made, not only to the 1919-1929 groups but, also, to the 1909 group . 
It must be assumed that the data for the earlier years were not suffi-
ciently accurate to be listed even though these data were relied up on 
for analytical purposes. 
In brief, Berle and Means r attitude was that a "corporate 
system" is evolving which bids fair to be as powerful in affecting the 
economy as was the feudal system->HH(·· They observed t hat, in 1930, the 
200 largest non-financial corporations held 49% of all the corporate 
wealth in the count~J, 38% of the business wealth, and 22% of the 
national wealtlr.~-;H~ . The 200 largest corporations had increased, in 
size, by 68% from 1909 to 1919 and 85% from 1919 to 1929->HHHHt-. They 
.," ). 
~~ 5, pp . 19-24. 
~:-;c.;;. 5, P• l. 
~a:--'~ 5, P• 32. 
~-~~-sr 5, p. 33. 
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estimated that the annual rate of growth of the 200 largest corpor-
ations had been 5.4% from 1909 to 1928 while the annual rate for 
corporations other than the 200 largest had been 2.0%. From 1924 to 
1928, they found that the largest corporations grmv at the rate of 
7.7% while all other corporations increased at the rate of 2.6%, in-
dicating that the 200 largest corpor~tions were growing three times 
a s fast as all other corporations*• These figures seem to add sub-
stance to the apprehensions of Berle and Means. 
There has been a fair amount of criticism leveled at the 
theory expounded in The Modern Corporation and Private Property->H(- . 
Of course, this theor y of the 11 corporate system" is r eally nothing 
but what Schumpeter has called Trustified Capitalism. The Tvfentieth 
Cen-tury Fund published a work which may be considered as a rebuttal · 
to Berle and Means~~:*· This rebuttal studied the largest corporations 
vrithin industry groups showing t~~t t he degr ee of concentration dis-
plays marked variat ion fr om one industry group to another, thus 
limiting the applicability of Berle and Means' deductions. 
There have, als o, been those who have defended the Berle 
and Means 1 finding~~:"**. Indeed, i t appears that t he philosophy of 
at l east one member of the Federal Trade Commission has been strongly 
influenced by t he concept of the corporate system?HHHHt . 
* 5, p. 35 
~* 10, PP• 69-83, and 11, pp. 149-155. 
*;Hf- 6 
~~ 12, PP• 30-35. 
*n~~_.M.V· 13 
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However, it is not our purpose to criticize Berle and Means. 
Rather, we should attempt to establish a link between The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property and the current study. 
We PAve defined as the purpose of this study an investiga-
tion into the composition and behavior of the largest corporations 
over time. Although there is a section devoted to the aggregate grovrth 
of this group of business firms, their growth is of secondary import to 
us. For the purposes of this study, the rate of change in composition, 
or turnover, within this group is of primary interest. 
Navf, Berle and Means do not ignore the changing composition 
of the group of largest firms-J:·, but such observation has been limited 
to the 1919-1929 period. From these observations, they conclude that 
the most important cause of firms dropping out of the 200 largest is 
corporate merger. However, their data do not substantiate this conclu-
sion as well as they do some of their other conclusions. Of the 200 
largest corporations in 1919, 46 had disappeared from the group by 
1929. Of these, 23 had merged, 21 still existed outside of the group, 
and two had been liquidated*--~· Considering that the period of observa-
tion Yfas a period of great business growth, characterized by mergers 
and the culmination of the development of the holding-company, the 
surprising thing isn't that 50% of the firms which had dropped out had 
been merged, but, rather, that only 5o% had merged. Furthermore, it 
may be pointed out that even if mergers had accounted for the dropping 
of firms from the group, obviously some new firm (net.v to the group 
* 5, pp. 42-44. 
*'.... 5, p. 43. 
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of the largest, at any rate) had to take the place of the merged 
corporation and this, in itself, may be an indication of the impact of 
innovation. Finally, the manifestation of the effect of innovation on 
the composition of the largest firms can take considerably more than 
ten years*· 
For the above reasons, we feel that Berle and Means have 
stretched their argument too far in attributing the majority of the 
dropped firms to mergers and concluding that the 200 largest corpora-
tions were r elatively stable in composition. This is important to us, 
for if Berle and Means had conclusively shown that the above assertion 
was an indisputable-or relatively indisputable-fact, there would be 
little purpose for us to continue this study. 
Discussion of the Berle and Means study should have L~cluded 
with it the work of the National Resources Committee entitled The Struc-
ture of the .1\merican Economy~H~ for the project was directed by Gardiner 
Means and is, in a real sense, a continuation of The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property. Appendix 10 presents a list of the 200 largest 
corporations li1 the United States as of 1935. The methods used to 
collect the data are somewhat more refined than those used by both Berle 
and Means, and your author. These will be discussed in the follow:ing 
chapter. The greater part of the National Resources Committee 's publi-
cation describes the economy by studying such economic phenomena as 
products, industrial areas, natural resource distribution, etc. Most 
* 2, pp. 166-171; 3, pp. 18-21; 7, pp . 93-94. 
ih"} 14. 
of this is not too relevant to the current study with its rather 
limited scope. 
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To our lmowledge, there is no other analytical study of the 
150 or 200 largest corporations, per se. The Department of Commerce 
published a list of 1,000 largest manufacturing corporations for 1945 
and 194~~. However, this is only a listing, with no text except foot-
notes, i gnoring railroads and public utilities, and thus, limiting its 
useful11ess. 
At the present time (June 1951), the Federal Trade Commission 
is preparing a similar listing of corporations. Unfortunately, t his 
will not be ready for publication until later in the summer and, t here-
fore, cannot be used at this time. 
C. Plan of the Study 
The next chapter vvill be devoted to the definitions and 
methods of gathering the data. Following will be a chapter concerned 
with the movements of the aggregate data over time and the problem of 
changing price levels and their effect on the data. Chapter IV vdll 
deal with the changes in composition using the method of rank correla-
tion and rate of turnover. Chapter V will combine t he r esults of the 
previous ~vo chapters L11 an attempt to analyze the effect of changes 
in composition on changes in aggregate values and, to a slight 
extent, relate these movements to their historical background. 
* 15. 
II. Collection and Definition of the Data 
A. The Criterion 
12. 
Obviously, the first problem which presents itself i..n. the 
study is that of the criteria by vwhich we select the largest corpora-
ation. From the previous chapter, the reader probably realises that 
we have used asset values as the criterion. Our purpose, in this 
secti on, is to attempt to justify that choice. 
A,mong the many possible criteria of siz._e, other than asset 
values, the follovv.Lng are most prominent: 
1. Profits 
2. Employment 
3. Physical units of production 
4. Value added tl1rough production. 
We shall attempt to shmv the problems connected with each of the above 
criteria in order of their presentation. 
1. Profits 
The arguments for the use of profit as a criterion is prob-
ably the weakest for any of the criteria. 
In the first place, how shall we define profits? The 
economist defines profit as an excess of revenues over all costs, in-
cluding implicit costs and opportunity costs. 1\:3 a r esult of ·the 
problem of actually defining cost* , the _businessmen 's profit ordinarily 
contai..n.s el ements of economic costs. Moreover, businessmen, themselves, 
do not have a consistent definition of profits. Profits usually are 
defined--~nplicitly--as a residual value of revenues after costs have 
* 16, Chapter II, pp. 12-32. 
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been deducted. But we are still faced with the problem of which costs 
are deducted . 
There are ~vo simple examples of this problem--calculation of 
depreciation* , and valuation of inventory. Depreciation may be calcu-
lated on a straight line basis, at a decreasing rate, at an increasing 
rate, at a rate tied in with sales or physical production, etc . Valu-
ation of inventory may be made on the actual cost for each unit, 
val uing all units of inventory at t he cost of the last unit (LIFO), 
valuing all units at the cost of the first unit (FIFO), or any other 
arbitrary method. 
In the second place, even after formulating a definition of 
profits, shall the rate of profits or the absolute amount of profits 
be used? Again, an example will serve to show the difficulties of t he 
problem. Given t wo business firms, one valued at $lo,ooo,ooo, the 
other valued at $l,ooo,ooo, assume that the first one earns $l,ooo,ooo, 
and t he second one earns $250,000 profit. Thus, if we determine size 
by the rate of profit, the second firm-~vith the profit of 25%--would 
be l ar ger t han the first, whose rate of profit is 10%, even though the 
first firm has earned four times the profits of the second one . 
Thirdly, even though .we decide to use the absolute size of 
profits as the criterion of corporate size, profits f luctuate in dif-
ferent w~ys from indus t r y to industry, and firm to f irm. Certain 
industries-- e . g . those connected with cons~~er perishable goods--vvill 
suffer less in a depression than will the manufacturers of investment 
goods . 
* 17, pp . 554-607. 
The policies of the individual firm >vill cause considerable 
fluctuation over time. These policies are similar to those v;e men-
tioned while discussing some of the problems arising in the definition 
of profits. Should a firm have a bond issue outstanding, which has a 
call-in clause at the firm's option, given favorable financial condi-
tions, the firm may find it expedient to shunt off earnings to the 
redemption of the bond issue. In this case, operating profits would 
probably be as high or higher than normal, but, because of the finan-
cial manipulation, balance-sheet profits would decline . Here, we 
would have an interesting paradox if we were to use profits--in the 
business sense--as the criterion of size, i.e., a firm strong enough 
to liquidate some of its debts, given a smaller rank as a result of 
strengthening its position. 
Finally, there is a subjective objection to the use of 
profits as the criterion of corporate size. In the thinking of most 
of us, size and sheer mass are synonomous. Profits have no direct 
relation to mass . 'When we look at two men, one of whom is big, bravmy, 
but stupid, and the other is slight and puny, but highly intelligent, 
we tend to think of the first one as the larger man, although the 
second man has the larger intelligence. The concept of profit may be 
likened to the second man, and, therefore, is not the customary cri-
terion of size. 
2. Employment. 
The use of employment as the criterion of corporate size is 
far less objectionable than the use of profits . That firm which is 
15. 
ranked among the largest by almost any criterion of size would probably 
have a sizable number of workers. However, when vve consider the fact 
that one of the characteristics of a large modern-day corporation is 
its heavy use of capital equipment, it seems that the use of employment 
figures may result in paradoxical situations. Should a firm invest 
heavily in capital goods of the labor-saving variety;~ the firm may be-
come larger when judged by such criteria as asset values, productivity, 
or profits, but it might be considered smaller when judged by the 
number of workers employed. The truth is that one of the main reasons 
why the corporate form has come into ascendancy has been to gather 
funds for the accumulation of capital goods. Therefore, the evaluation 
of the size of these corporations through employment seems somewhat 
archaic and, possibly, contradictory to the nature of the corporate form. 
3. Physical Production. 
As was the case with employment, those firms which are among 
the largest , according to most criteria of size, will also be large when 
judged by their physical production. The primary objection to this stand-
ard is the lack of comparability in ur.d_ts of physical production . The 
Pennsylvania Railroad produces railroad mileage and freight carloadL~gs. 
The Boston Edison Company produces kilowatts of electricity. The United 
States Steel Corporation produces nothing, but its subsidiaries produce 
tons of steel. AlCOA. produces alunri.num ingots. Standard Oil produces 
barrels and gallons of petroleum products . This listing could be ex-
tended indefinitely. However, the examples given are sufficiently 
->,t- 18., P • 291 
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numerous to illustrate that the use of physical production as the cri-
terion of corporate size is akin to the classic problem of adding apples 
and oranges . Not only does this problem exist bebveen firms and indus-
tries, it also exists within firms, both at a given moment of time and 
over periods of time. At any moment of time, large corporations produce 
any number of items. For example, B. F. Goodrich Company produces such 
diverse items as rubber tires, rubber tubes, life rafts, bathing caps, 
rubber sheeting, industrial belts, etc. 
vVhen considering a firm over a period of time, we are faced 
with the problem of qualitative changes, e.g., the automobile of today 
as compared to the 1930 model. Changes of product further complicate 
consideration of a firm over time, e.g., the switch of teA~ile compan-
ies from cotton manufacture to rayon manufacture. 
Beside the problem of comparability, there is a further 
problem of double counting. Various firms contribute to the making of 
a finished good. If we were to use physical production as the stand-
ard of corporate size, the copper produced by Anaconda Copper Company 
would be counted a second ti.me when we calculated the number of copper-
lined cans turned out by the .Nnerican Can Company. This could be 
avoided by adjusting for net contribution-l~, but such an adjustment 
would have difficulties of its 0\'i'rH~. 
4. Value Added . 
Of the four possible criteria of corporate size, value added 
through manufacturli1g is probably the most desirable. It is subject to 
none of the obj ections raised against profits. Large firms would have 
* 19, pp. 112-117. 
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a large value added figure. It is subject to none of the charges 
against employment. The use of capital goods would tend to increase 
the value added figure. All units would be translated into net value 
units, thus avoiding the problems of comparability and double count-
ing that would arise were we to use the concept of physical production. 
However, there are two problems which would arise if we 
were to use value added through manufacturing as the criterion of cor-
porate siz.e. 
Value added through manufacturing necessitates the use of 
the concept of stages of economic activity. As is well lmown, prices 
fluctuate differently be~veen retail, wholesale, manufacturing, and 
extraction levels. This poses a very nasty problem of deflation if 
we are to compare the figures for firms on different levels of produc-
tion over time. Deflation is always a difficult business, for appro-
priate indices are simply not available. All of the sophistication of 
the value added concept would be lost through the use of a crude 
deflation method and the deflated values might well be meaningless. 
Even if precise tools of deflation were at hand, we would 
have no little difficulty in gathering data on which to use these 
tools. The Bureau of Census prepares value added series in the Census 
of Manufactures . It is a criminal offense to reveal such Census data 
unless the data are aggregated, so that the information for individual 
establishments is concealed. For our purposes, individual L~ormation 
is vltal so that, despite the qualities of the value added criterion 
of size, we must abandon the attempts to use it. 
18. 
5. Asset Values. 
At this point, it almost seems that the use of asset values 
as the criterion of size vdns out, if only by default. However, the 
use of asset values has positive advantages also. 
The objections which have been mentioned in connection with 
the above criteria, either do not exist when we use asset values or do 
not exist in the same degree. 
Asset values for individual firms are readily available in 
the security manuals. They d6 give us an indication of the size of 
corporations in terms of grossness, which is the way we customarily 
think of siz~e. Asset values do offer problems of deflation, but these 
are not nearly as great as the deflation difficulties we would have to 
solve were we to use the value added criterion. Since asset values 
ignore products, we can treat firms as entities over time, even if 
their output changes in composition and character. 
The asset values used in the study were taken from balance 
sheets in the annual manuals published by Moody's Investment Service. 
Unfortunately, this source offers no definition of balance sheet com-
ponents. Therefore, it is probable that definitions of balance sheet 
components were not standardiZBd. 
Depreciation caused the greatest problem. Prior to the 
passli1g of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, which made the federal 
income tax constitutional, fmv American firms considered depreciation 
in their accounting procedures. By the end of World War I, because 
of the tax laws, almost all large· firms carried reserves for depreci-
ation. Methods of computing depreciation vary. There is no perfect 
19. 
way of estimating how much depreciation accounts would have been in 
those cases where no such accounts ~Listed. We had three choices of 
method in the treatment of depreciation. We could crudely estimate 
depreciation where it wasn•t given and deduct it from the total asset 
value. We could add the depreciation component into the assets of 
the firms which carried depreciation accounts. Lastly, we could 
i gnore the entire issue and accept the total asset figure as given in 
the balance sheet, regardless of whether said figure was net or gross 
of depreciation. We chose the last method. 
Our choice does not produce too much distortion in the move-
ment . AP has been said, from about 1920 on, most firms carried depre-
ciat ion accounts. Therefore, only the earliest observation (1909) has 
depreciation included in the asset figures . vVhen we consider the fact 
that many of the firms, in 1909 were new--or relatively new--with the 
exception of railroads, and that from 1909 to 1919 many new processes 
and products necessitating nmv investment were developed by the indus-
trial and public utility corporations, it seems obvious that consider-
ing asset values gross of depreciation would not be as serious for 1909, 
as it would be for 1949. 
Also, even if we should decide to count assets net of depre-
ciation for each observation_, we would not be deducting the same kind 
of depreciation in each instance. We have already mentioned the 
problems of different methods of calculating depreciation. Beside this, 
the concept of depreciation has changed over time until now, in many 
instances, it not only includes the physical wearing out of assets, but, 
also, the technological wearing out of assets, i.e., obsolescence. 
20. 
Lastly, were we to consider assets gross of depreciation, we 
would have homogeneity, but it would be at the sacrifice of the con-
sideration of depreciation for the last 25 or 30 years. Such a sacri-
fice is great, indeed, vmen we recall the prominence which has been 
given to the depreciation account, partially· as a result of tax laws 
but, also, because of the rapid obsolescence rate, which is part of 
Creative Destruction--a result of innovation. The fact that it is 
usually the larger firms which make much of depreciation (witness 
Voorhees 1 statements during the U. S. Steel hearings in 1948) may be 
another indication of the existence of innovation. This stress upon 
depreciation and obsolescence (frequently synonomous terms in business) 
could be interpreted as the retrenchment of the older firms to with-
stand the onslaught of n~rer, more vlgorous business enterprises . The 
latter statement has no statistical evidence offered on its behalf in 
the current study, but shotud not be ignored as a possibility. 
B. The Definition and Selection of Firms . 
1. Vfuy 150 Corporations? 
It has been noted that Burle and Means selected 200 corpor-
ations for their study of the largest corporations. We have used 
only 150. 
~ this study progressed, it became apparent that we might 
as well have selected f~ver than 150 firms. These firms represent one 
tail end of a frequency distribution of all firms. Therefore, the 
fewer firms we select, the less their characteristics would resemble 
those of all other firms, and the more we can speak of gigantic cor-
porations as being something quite apart from the run-of-the-mill 
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fi~ms. However, it must be admitted that the latter statement did not 
become apparent until t he data had been collected. 
For the earliest observations, we selected asset values with 
$40 millions as the minimum value. It happened that the number of 
firms with assets of ~~40 millions or more were slightly more than 150. 
So, although the choice of the nDJllber of firms might be defensible, 
actually, the choice was arbitrary and a matter of chance. 
2. The Periods of Observation~ 
Observations were made at ten-year intervals, beginning with 
1909, and extending to 1949. The data were for December 31 of the year 
immediately prior to the observation year . The choice of observation 
dates was decided on the basis of expediency. At the time the data were 
collected, the 1949 edition of Moody's was the latest available. Prior 
to 1900, information is not available except for railroads. The ten-
year span has no significance except convenience. 
3. The Problem of Inter-Corporate Relations. 
Obviously, the fact that one corporation has a property inter-
est in another corporation is of economic significance . However, the 
exploration of these relationships could easily be, and undoubtedly has 
been, the subject of another thesis. Although we do not choose to go 
into the problems of holding companies, subsidiary companies, and 
affiliates, we must face the problem to the extent of avoiding double 
counting of assets. If the assets of General Motors are included in 
the DuPont balance sheet, we would have to either deduct GM assets from 
the DuPont assets, or not include GM among t he largest corporations. 
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Unfortunately, the balance sheets frequently fail to give as much infor-
mation as was needed for this purpose. 
Moody's often presents two balance sheets for firms w:b..ich have 
interests in other firms, a Lrconsolidated11 balance sheet and a "sL"'Il.ple" 
balance sheet. The consolidated balance sheet contains assets of sub-
sidiary corporations. The simple balance sheet presents the assets of 
the firm under observation alone. In all cases where the consolidated 
balance sheet was presented, the asset figure was taken from it. Usually, 
the firms, whose assets were included in the consolidated balance sheet, 
were separately listed. Such firms were not counted again. However, we 
suspect that all firms which were included in consolidated balance sheets 
were not always indicated. Just how great the error arising from double 
counting because of this failure to separate related firms is, we don't 
know. It undoubtedly is sizable in absolute terms, but would have to be 
tremendouB if its correction were to seriously alter our analysis, for 
the correlation coefficients are extreme, and the aggregate sums have 
wide differences from year to year. The National Resources Committee 
treated the problem of inter-corporate relations by omitting those firms 
which have 5o% of their assets owned by another corporation*· SEC re-
ports were used to aid in determining control. IV:hile this method is 
precise enough, the wisdom of using 50% as the critical level is ques-
tionable. The possession of 107~ of A.. T. & T. t s stock would be suffi-
cient for control. In fact, as Berle and Means point out~l1:-, character-
istically, no individual stock holder owns as much as 10% of the truly 
?~ JlJ., Appendix 10, p. 273. 
7h'f- 5, Chapter IV, PP• 47-58. 
23. 
giant corporations. Therefore, most of those corporations omitted by 
NRC would probably not have been included anyway, for it seems unlikely 
t hat theywould be large enough to have been included among the largest. 
For this reason, we suspect that double counting errors are as large in 
the stunies of Berle and Means and the NRC as they are in the current 
study. Besides, it is OliT strong feeling that effective control is ex-
erted in more subtle ways than through direct or indirect ownership of 
stock, so that no presently feasible method of adjustment would be 
completely successful in eliminating double counting~!- . 
~~ Concerning the ramifications of inter-corporate relationships, we 
are reminded of the time vvhen we were told that attempts to per-
ceive the extent of industrial ·combinations-much less, to break 
thern-~have been, and would always be, unsuccessful . Our informant 
should know of what he sperucs, for he has been working on the 
problem of Cartels and other combination forms for over ten years . 
During World War II, he had the opportunity to become very famil-
iar with the tortuous international ramifications of such cartels 
as the Farben combine which had relations with American corpora-
tions even during the war . 
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III. The Aggregate Data 
In this chapter, we shall, f irst, compare our aggregate data 
with the data presented by Berle and Means. Secondly, we sha~l discuss 
the characteristics of the distribution of the aggregate data. A...Tld, 
lastly, we shall attempt to remove the effect of changing prices on the 
aggregate data. 
A. Comparison of Data 
Table I - Total Asset Values of the Largest Corporations 
(in millions of dollars) 
Year Be-.cle & Means Our Data % Differences 
(l ) (2) (3) (4) 
(2)-(3)/(3) 
1909 ~~26,063 $23,795 9.6% 
1919 43,718 36,924 18.4 
1929 81,074 69,293 17.0 
Source: Moody's Railroad, Public Utility, and Industrial 1v1anuals, 
1909, 1919, and 1929. 
Table I compares our date for the 150 largest corporations 
-vfi th the Berle and Means date for the 200 largest corporations for the 
years 1909, 1919, and 1929. Column (4) shows the percentage differen-
ces between the figures. 
Obviously, differences should exist as Berle and Means cover 
5o more corporations than do we. If each of the 200 largest corpora-
tions were exactly the same size, Berle and Means' figures should be 
one-third larger than ot~s . As the values definitely vary for each 
corporation--vnth the gathering of corporations in the lower value 
groups--the difference is less than one-third. 
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Hmvever, we mi ght, l egitimately, expect percentage differ-
ences to be relatively constant for the three comparisons. Such is not 
t he case. For the year 1909, the figure of Berle and Means is almost 
10% larger than our figures. For 1919, and 1929, the percentage in-
creased to about 18%. 
If there had been wide divergencies between all three 
percentage differences, we might attribute such variations to random 
causes. However, the differences for 1919 and 1929 are almost identi-
cal. 'What, then, can explain the change between the earliest observa-
tion and the two later ones? 
We could use this divergency as a charge against the Berle 
and Means contention of the existence of a growing system of large 
corporations which tend to remain in power and flourish throughout any 
economic period. Were we to undertake this tempting task, we would 
say that the divergencies among the percentage differences were due to 
the fact that the 5o smallest corporations of Berle and Means 1 200 
largest had increased in size over time at a greater rate than the 
remaining 150. This, then, would be an indication that the largest 
corporations were really not so overpowering as Berle and Means would 
have us believe. 
However, we must challenge Berle and Means on other, safer 
grounds . There is another explanation which is, we believe, more con-
servative and more acceptable. If the reader will recall, in the 
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last chapter, we indicated that the asset values for 1909 were gross of 
depreciation. As a result of the income tax laws and the increased 
maturity of the economy, firms did deduct depreciation from asset values 
for the later periods. Berle and Means have treated all asset values 
net of depreciation, although they do not describe the method of ellinina-
tion Yvhich they used prior to 1913. Therefore, the change in the percen-
tage differences between 1909 and the later periods is probably due to 
the depreciation difference f or 1909. 
With the exception of the 1909 observation, the differences 
betw·een the date of Berl e and Means and our data seem to be almost com-
pletely explained by the larger number of corporations covered by Berle 
and Means. 
B. The Characteristics of the Distribution. 
In the last chapter, we discussed the number of firms which 
were chosen to represent the largest corporations. Ve chose 15'0, and 
Berle and Means and the NRC chose 200. Both numbers are arbitrary. 
In Table II, the mean, median, lowest value, and highest 
value for each observation are presented. 
Table II - The Dispersion Values of the Assets of the 150 Largest 
American Corporations, by Decades, 1909-1949 . 
(in millions of dollars) 
Year Lowest Median Mean F..ighest 
1909 $422 $730 ~pl69 $1, 764 
1919 73 129 246 2, 752 
1929 16o 319 461 3, 827 
1939 182 362 533 5,120 
1949 212 3:89 630 10,000 
Source: Moody's Investment Manuals; 1909, 1919, 1929, 1939, and 
1949. 
It may be observed that, at all times, the mean is considerably 
larger than the median, and that there is a tremendous difference between 
the value the 15oth corporation and the largest corporation. 
If these 150 firms were in a class unto themselves, we would 
expect the mean and median to be almost identical. The mean is greater 
than the median because there are a few firms with extremely high asset 
values, and a lumping of firms ·with a considerably lower asset value . 
Obviously, then, we are not dealing with a normal distribution. Rather, 
this is the tail-end of a frequency distribution of all firms . 
As the mean and median are measures of cent ral tendency, based 
on the theory of the normal curve or Gaussian distribution-- and we do not 
have a nonnal distribution--we may not use those measures in this study. 
This casts serious doubt on the advisability of treating the 150 or 200 
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largest firms as being a group relatively independent of all other 
corporations. 
If 150 corporations are too large a group to be considered 
"The Largest Corporations, n how shall the proper number be deternrined? 
The solution to this problem is to have the mean and median as close 
together as possible. They would not be i dentical even if we con-
sidered only the two largest firms. AP the number of firms ~~der 
consideration are diminished, the mean and median will increase in 
value, but the rate of increase will be different for each of the 
two measures. By charting the rates of increase for the two meas-
ures, and selecting the number of firms at that point where the dif-
ference between the rates of increase is greatest, we would have come 
as close as is possible to selecting a statistical group of the 
largest firms. For any number of firms greater or less than this 
number, the difference between the mean and the median would be greatm·. 
It should be borne in mind that, even by using the above 
method, we have not isolated a group of the largest firms in an 
economic sense, but, rather, have approximated a statistical group. 
Manipulate as we will, the distribution will more closely resemble an 
ogive than a bell. 
In the last fevv paragraphs, we have raised a point which will 
be re-emphasized as the study precedes. The 150 larges t corporations 
are merely the 150 corporations vvith the largest asset values. They 
form no separate system, or empire immune from economic occurrences, 
and have a direct, emphatic relationship 1vith the rest of the economic 
world. 
c. The Effect of Price Changes on Asset Values. 
l. Why Adjust? 
Since our observations extended over a period of forty years, 
it may not be assumed that the dollars in which assets were e'..o..--pressed 
for the earlier years are the same as the dollars in which the asset 
values of the later years were expressed. If we are to compare the 
aggregates of the various periods, we must adjust the data, so that the 
dollars of any one period are the same as those of any other . In 
other words, we must adjust for the effect of changing prices over time. 
The accepted method for accomplishing this end is to deflate t he data 
by the use of a price index. 
2. The Problems. 
The first problem which we must face is the selection of the 
proper index. We are dealing ~dth prices and, specifically, the prices 
of assets. Balance sheet assets consist primarily of three components; 
(1) products of the firm in a semi-finished and completed state as repre-
sented by inventory and accounts receivable; (2) raw material stocks; 
and (3) capital goods, such as plant and equipment. With the exception 
of product, the other components are plainly not consumption goods. 
Also, in most cases, the products of the firms under observation are not 
consumption goods . Therefore, the use of a wholesale price index seems 
proper. 
A perfect deflator would have to include the price movements 
of each of the balance sheet components, weighted according to the im-
portance of each component in the total asset figure . Hovrever, when we 
consider the diverse nature of assets which we encounter from firm to 
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firm, the development of one deflator which could be universally 
satisfactory is impossible. We must either accept some general index 
which, we hope, will remove most of the price variations, or go 
through some involved, and probably incorrect method of averaging the 
proportions of each type of asset in each industry. Even if we could 
determine the various proportions, we still would be faced with the 
problem of gathering the prices for each asset over time. As the 
easiest course, we have decided to use the Bureau of Labor Statistics' 
Wholesale Price Index. 
However, with this decision, we have not solved all defla-
tion problems. For example, since capital goods frequently have a 
life greater than one year, simply deflating for the observation year 
would not remove the proper amount of price variation. 
Let us elaborate on this problem. Given a balance sheet 
containing $1,000,000 of capital goods, it would not be unusual for 
25% of the capital goods to have been purchased ten years ago, 25% 
seven years ago, 25% two years ago, and 25% to have been purchased in 
the current year . The solution is obvious. We must adjust for the 
prices of assets purchased in years prior to the current period as 
vrell as for those purchased during the current period . 
The proposed adjustment is not without its ovm diff iculties. 
For instance, current practice in some firms is to express the value 
of assets in terms of replacing costs, rather than LD original cost. 
To the extent that t:b..is is practiced, it would not be necessary to 
adjust for the price variations f or other than the current period. 
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However, the use of replacement value is relatively new, and, it may be 
suspected, is approved of more in theory than in practice. For this 
reason, we would not be warranted in assuming that current accounting 
procedure obviates the necessity of adjusting for prices in other than 
the current period. 
Again, the problem of deflation would be simplified if all 
durable assets had the same life expectancy and were purchased at the 
same time. Were this the case, we could simply average the index for 
the period in which the durable assets were purchased with the index 
of the current period (during which the 11 variable" assets were pur-
chased) and deflate by this average. However, life is not t~Bt simple. 
AP illustrated in our small example, assets are pl.:trchased at different 
periods of time . Not only that, but th~, also, have differing life 
expectancies. 
As there is no information available to clarify this situa-
tion, we must resort to some arbitrary method and hope that it is 
fairly accurate. We have chosen to average the wholesale price index 
for the current year and the two preceding years, i.e., for 1949, we 
would average the index for the years 1946, 1947, and 1948. It is our 
feeling that despite the existence . of such extremely durable assets as 
locomotives, plants, blast furnaces, etc., most assets have a relative-
ly short life. Furthermore, the periods of observation were primarily 
periods of high investment which would lead us to suspect that assets 
were younger than might have otherwise have been the case. Although 
1909 was a "crisis" year, this was mainly a banker's crisis and very 
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short-lived. The year 1909 occupied a position close t o the peak of 
the Kondratieff long-wave, and 1919 was an immediate post-war year 
characterized by high investment. The year 1929 was a prosperity year 
which vdtnessed t he culmination of the merger movement, and was a high 
:LrlVes t ment period, while 1939 is an exception to the rule in that the 
per iods of observat ion were high investment periods. I t followed the 
calamitous depressions of the thirties, and the entire decade had com-
paratively little private investment. The year 1949, however, was a 
prosperity period. Thus with four out of the five observat ion periods 
characterized by high investment, our statement concerning the newness 
of assets seems justifiable. 
By using the three-year average, admittedly, we have excluded 
the deflation of some assets and of long-life despite t he arguments 
presented in the previous paragraph, possibly a si~able amount. 
3. Testing the Method. 
In order to estimate the amount of difference when using the 
three-year average as compared to the results when using the one year 
index, we have deflated by both methods. Thus, we may estimate the 
effect of extending the nQmber of years covered by the deflator. 
Table III (A) contains the total asset values in current prices, III (B) 
shows the asset values when deflated by the three-year average index:, 
and III (C), the values when deflated by the index for the year of 
observation. 
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Table III - Total Asset Values of the 150 Largest Corporations, by 
Selected Groups, from 1909 to 1949, by Decades. 
(in millions of dollars) 
(A.) Current Prices 
1909 1919 1929 1939 1949 
(l) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) 
Industrials $5,377 ~~11, 763 $21,196 $21,607 ~Ul-1, 717 
Public Utilities 1,932 5,428 23,828 33,749 31,042 
Railroads 16,486 19,732 24,268 24,268 24,567 
Totals $23,795 $36,924 $69,293 $79,923 $94,513 
(B) Deflated by a 3- Year Average of the 
Wholesale Price Index: 
Industrials ~~8,494 $10,319 $21, 762 $26,383 $28,554 
Public Utilities 3,052 4,761 24,464 41,207 21, 247 
Railroads 26,060 17,309 24,916 29, 996 14,890 
Totals $38,106 $32,389 $71,143 $97,586 $64,690 
(C) Deflated by the Current Year ' s 
Yiholesale Price Index: 
Industrials ~~ 8,494 $8,959 ~p21,920 $27,490 $25,283 
Public Utili ties 3,052 4,134 24, 641 42,937 18,813 
Railroads 26,tfif) 15,028 25,097 31,256 13,184 
Totals $37, ~ $28,122 $71,658 $101,684 $57 ,28o 
Now, let us see if any significant differences exist bet ween 
the t wo methods of deflation. We shall utilize the customary formula 
for this purpose: A-B/SD(a-b) = t, when A is the mean of the values 
deflated by the three-year average, B is the mean of the values deflated 
by t he single year index, and SD (a-b) is the st~~dard error of the 
latter two means which is derived by finding the square root of the 
sum of the standard deviations. Rather than calculate the differences 
for each of the observations, let us save time by calculating for the 
year in which the greatest relative difference appears between the two 
methods of deflation . By inspection, we find this year to be 1919. 
Substituting the values into the formula, we have 10 . 6 - 9.3/ 6 . 8 
= 1 . 9 = t. From a table of probability values, we find, that with 
four degrees of freedom, the probability value for this difference is 
slightly larger than . 1. In other words, we may expect a difference 
as large as this, or larger, to occur more than ten times out of a 
hundred . When we consider that the bench mark for t he probability 
value is customa~ily . 01, i.e., ~. difference as great or greater occur-
ing once out of a hundred times to be significant, it is clear t hat no 
statistical difference exists between the results of the t wo methods 
of deflationll-. To translate this into more meaningful language, we 
have demonstrated by the above tests that no wide differences have been 
introduced as a result of using the composite index rather than the 
index for a sL~gle year. 
Although no statistical difference exists between the results 
of using the three-year index as opposed to the one-year index, it seems 
likely were we to use a greater number of years in the average index, a 
statistically significant difference would occur. Since we have used 
only logical analysis to justify a multi-year index, we would be guilty 
of extreme recklessness if we used a multi-year index which would re-
sult in figures that would differ significantly from the results of 
.,:. 20, pp . 329-330 . 
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deflating by the one-year index:. 
IV. Changes in the Composition of the 150 Largest Corporations. 
It was noted that we were to analyze two types of variation 
in the 150 largest corporations. These were the change in asset 
values over time and t he changes in the composition of the largest 150. 
The method used to determine the variations in asset value was dis-
cussed in the previous section. In this section, it is our purpose to 
discuss the methods used to measure the changing composition of our 
data. 
A. Measurement by the Method of Rank Correlation. 
The most obvious method vdth which to measure changes in the 
composition of our data is correlation. In general, there are two 
methods of computing a coefficient of correlation;(. the Pearsonian method, 
and the Spearman method of rank correlation. 
1. The Reason for Using the Spearman Coefficient of Correlation. 
Although, for most purposes, the Pearsonian method is super-
ior~~~, in this instance, it would not give the desired ;nformation. 
This is so because the latter met hod takes tvvo groups of values and 
determines the difference betvveen and within the groups. If we were to 
use the Pearsonian method, we would have to correlate asset values, and 
-ll- Admittedly, there are more t han two recognized methods of deriv-ing 
a correlation coefficient. However, as we are dealing vdth only one 
attribute, position, we speak of simple correlation. Also, we assume 
statistical linearity. The above statement is true of simple linear 
correlation. 
i'r.;"'· For an excellent statement on simple correlation, methods of 
measur ement, their advantages and disadvantages, the reader is 
referred to 20, Chapter 22. 
36. 
this would not indicate changing composition and positional changes. 
A. simple example proves this point. Take A, B, C, and D; .where in 
the first observation, their respective values are 2, 4, 6, and 8. In 
the second observation, let their values be 8, 16, 24, and 32. Using 
the Pearsonian method, we derive as coefficient correlation benveen .9 
and 1.0. Using the method of rank correlation, our value equals 1.0. 
The reason for the difference, which because of the fevmess of items, 
is highly sigD..ificant even though it is small, is that the second 
observation was of a greater magnitude than the first. This differ-
ence, which obscures the positional changes, is taken into account by 
the Pearsonian method and is ignored bJr the Spearman method which 
correlates rank alone. 
The technique used to determine the coefficient of raruc 
correlation~!- was to rank the firms for each observation according to 
asset value. The firm vrith the largest value was ranked as 1 and the 
firm ¥lith the lowest asset value was raruced as 150. Then comparisons 
simply were made to determine the rank changes for the firms between 
observations. Five correlations were thus made. Comparisons were made 
betw-een the earliest and latest observations to detennine over-all 
?~ The formula used by Spearman is derived from the Pearsonian formula. 
The Pearsonian formula is as follows: 
sum of xy 
r = 1- V (sum of x squared) (sum of y squared) 
The Spearman formula is: 
6(surn of the rank differences squared) 
R = l- N (N squared - 1) 
Certain similarities are striking even to the non-mathematician. The 
formal proof can be worked out by the mathematician. Some hints as to 
approach are given by 20, Appendix B, Sec. XXIV-4. 
37 . 
changes and they were also made between succeeding observations . The 
coefficients of correlation thus determined are shown in Table IV, 
column (2). 
Table IV - Coefficients of Raru{ Correlation for the 150 Largest 
Corporations, 1909-1949, by Decades . 
Obs ervations Unadjusted Percentage of New Adjusted 
R Values Corporations R Values 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1909-1949 .13 59% .o5 
1909-1919 .43 48% .22 
1919-1929 . 28 51% .14 
1929-1939 .51 29% . 36 
1939-1949 .51 36% . 33 
Source: Moody ' s Investment Service. 
2. Problems in R.a.~g . 
Only one problem had to be ttsolvedl1 in the method of corre-
lation. This had to d o with new firms* • These firms were not included 
in preceding observations so that t hey had no rank value from which to 
compute a rank difference over time . 
* There was no separate problem of firms dropping out . Because the 
total number of firms in each observation were held constant a t 15o, 
new firms had to equal the number of firms which dropped out . There-
fore, the method used to deal with new firms, automatically dealt with 
the f irms which were no longer included in the observation. 
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There were several possible methods, none of which were com-
pletely satisfactory. The new firms could be ignored. This would not 
only diJninish the number of firms observed, but would introduce a 
ranking error. This ranking error would occur because the nmv firms 
were not always the lowest ranking firms. Frequently, a nevr firm 
would be between older firms. 
Assume firms A, B, and C are the first, second, and third 
largest corporations in a given observation. Assume that B is a new 
firm. If we were to ignore new firms, l\ and C would be ranked as first 
and second. This obviously is not true. 1Uso, we would dimi.11ish the 
number of firms quite significantly. Almost 60% of the firms which 
existed in 1949 as part of the 150 largest were not included in the 
1909 observation. It was felt, therefore, that the error introduced 
by ignoring nmv firms was two-fold; it would shrink the siz.:e of our 
observations and would introduce ranking error which would be reflected 
in the computation of rank differences. Even if we gi ve completely 
false ranks to the new firms, we would only be guilty of the latter 
error for the size of our observations would remain the same. 
It might have been wise to determine the true rank of the 
firms. That is, take firm A, which we will assume was a new firm in 
1949 ranking 30; find its position in 1939, which might have been 
430th, and compute rank difference. This procedure is open to three 
objections. The first is that the amount of work necessary to accom-
plish this would be considerable. Second, it is not inconceivable that 
a firm which is nevr in a current observation, did not exist in a 
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preceding observation for it was not formed at that time. This is true 
of many of the public utility holding companies. lastly, even if the 
firm did exist, the inclusion of any rank &~eater than 150 in our com-
putation would be mathematically incorrect. The denominator of the 
formula for correlation, any kind of correlation, makes reference to the 
number of items. In rank correlation, no rank difference can be greater 
than N-1; in our case, 149. If we vrere to follow the above suggestion, 
the differences could be as great as infinity-1. This would produce a 
coefficient which would easily be greater than 1, which is the value 
for perfect correlation. Therefore, the method using the true ranks 
for new firms, so as to compute rank differences, is useless. Thus, we 
know that whatever ranks we assign to the new firms must not be greater 
than 150. One might suggest the rank of 0 for the new· firms. Since we 
raruced the firms from highest to lowest, 1 to 150, assigning the nEWr 
firms 0 rank would introduce error, not only as a result of false rank-
ing, but also as a result of ranking in the wrong direction . iVhatever 
ra!lJc the nevr firm actually had in the period in which it was not in-
cluded, the raruc was greater than 150. Assume firm A with a rank of 
J..40 in the period in which it was included and an actual rank of 151 
in the period preceding. Using 0 as its rank, we have a rank differ-
ence of minus Jlfo with an incorrect negative sign which would indicate 
that it had dropped in rank, rather than increased in rank and, also, 
a difference whose magnitude is completelyv~ong. 
It might be possible to compute a mean or other measure of 
central tendency of the ranlcs of the new· firms from the period in 
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which they were observed, and assign this measure as the rank for all 
new firms in the period in which they were not included. This would 
introduce raru{ ties, which is the biggest disadvantage of the Spearw~n 
method. More important than that, however, is the same objection 
which was given against the use of the 0 rank. The sign of difference, 
for at least half of the nmv firms, would be wrong . 
Thus we have eliminated the possibility of using the true 
ranks of the nevv firms. We have also set up two conditions: first, the 
assigned rank cannot be greater than 150; second, the sign of the dif-
ference must be positive so as to indicate the firms had a l~ver ran~ in 
the earlier observation in which they were not included than they had 
when they were included in the current observation. 
The logical arbitrary rank for new firms, in the observation 
in which they were not included, is 150. The only error of sign which 
would occur is in the case where the nmv firm had a raru{ of 150 in the 
observation in which it was included. This sign error would be very 
small, and insignificant. Also, no difference could be greater than 149. 
'I1vo errors will remain. They are errors of magnitude and errors induced 
because of rank ties. These errors would exist in any method except 
that of using the true ranks. AP noted, the latter cannot be done 
>vitrutn i the li:rnits of the observation size. 
3. Adjustment for Error . 
The ran~ of 150 was assigned to firms which only appeared in 
one of the pair of observations used in the computation of the coeffi-
cient of correlation. It is felt that the errors introduced because of 
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raclc ties and sign difference are r elatively small. The error of 
magnitudes is great. The exact amount of error cannot be determined, 
but it can be approximated by considering t he movement of new firw~ 
into the group of the 150. 
Table IV, Column (2) shows the coefficients of correlation 
and Column (3) shows the percentage of new firms which entered for 
each pair of observations (indicated in Column (1). Generally speak-
ing, the higher the coefficient of correlation, the lower is the 
percentage of new firm~~. The coefficient of correlation, herein-
after referred to as R, for 1929-1939 is identical with the R for 
1939-1949. However, in the latter period, the percentage of nffi~ firms 
was greater . The error introduced by the method with which nffiv firms 
were treated will induce an upvvard bias in R. Therefore, the true R 
* The inverse relationship between R and the percentage of new firms, 
which is noted above, is not particularly startling. Part of it can 
be explained by the method with which we dealt with new firms . The 
more new firms in a computation, the more firms existed with a rank 
of 150 . However, not all of the relationship is attributable to our 
technique . By keeping N constant at 150, it is obvious that the more 
newr firms entering the observation, the greater the difference, re-
sulting in a lower value for R. Thus, the percentage of newr firms is 
a rough vmy of measuring the changes in composition which is what R 
measures . However, R and the percentage of nevv firms are not int,er-
changeable . R, not only measures the effect of changing composition, 
but it also measures positional change. The percentage of n~N firms 
i gnores the old firms and positional changes . Were the distribution 
of firms random, we could approximate the positions of new firms 
through the combination of the use of the percentage of nev<r firms 
and probability tables . Here, the distribution of the nevv firms, 
among the 150, is not random but skevved in favor of classes in the 
100-150 raclc range . 
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for 1939-19L.9 is not identical to that of 1929-1939, but is som81J'rhat 
smaller because more new firms entered during the later period. 
We may now consider a possible adjustment to partially off-
set the error. This is simply to multiply the percentage of new 
firms by the value of R for a given period, and subtract the result 
from R. 
4. Interpretation of the Adjustment. 
A. method such as this is very dangerous not because of what 
it >vill do, but because of what the reader may think it >vill do. The 
naive reader may accept this method as being an excellent correction 
for R. The more sophisticated reader will realize that this can be 
an accurate correction for R, only if the n81J'r firms, which consti-
tute the reason for error, are new not only to the 150 largest corpor-
ations, but also, to the entire corporate population. I f they are 
not, the use of this method of correction will intr oduce a bias of 
the opposite magnitude, i.e., making the value for R smaller t han it 
act ually is. From the data, we lmmv that new f irms are, in many in-
s tances, new only t o the group of the largest corporations . There are 
a fair number of instances where a firm appears among t he 150 largest 
in one observation, disappears in the next, only to reappear in some 
later observation. 
However, the suggested method of adjustment can be justi-
fied i f we consider what the R value is. R, per se, means nothing. 
We can add meaning to the value of R only through comparison of R 
values. Essentially , this is what we are doing with the R values for 
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the 150 largest corporations. For the comparison to be valid, it is 
necessary that the R values be measurements of homogeneous groups. It 
makes no difference how much error exists in any single R value as 
long as the same amount of error exists in all of the other R values. 
If the percentage of nevv firms were equal for all observations, the 
error of magnitude for any R value Yvould be equal to that of any other. 
The error would exist in the R value alone, but the comparisons of R 
values would be true a.."1.d without error. This essentially is what our 
adjustment ~rill accomplish. We have reasoned that the error is a 
result of the entry of nffi'l firms. The more firms entering, the 
larger vrill be the error. By our process, we are, in a sense deflat-
ing for the changing percentages of firms. It should be repeated, the 
error is not being removed by this process. It is being equalized. 
The error itself may be partially removed. However, it is just as 
likely that we are overcorrecting the individual R. Regardless of 
what heppens to the individual R, the values compared will be homo-
geneous I'd. th the extraneous variable of error, not isolated, but 
equ.alized so that no R value is more affected by it than is any other 
R value. 
5. Interpretation of R Values. 
The R values represent two t;ypes of change . The first is 
change of position among old firms and the second type is change 
resulting from the entry of new firms. 
With one exception, 1939-1949, the R values, that is, the 
adjusted R values, have an inverse relationship to the percentage 
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of new firms. By observing the movements of both the R values and the 
percentage of new firms, it vrill b e possible to determine whether change 
occurred primarily among the old firms, or as a result of nff« firms . 
Almost 605~ of the firms which existed in 1949, did not exist 
in 1909. Over the same period, the corrected R value is .o5, which 
is by far the lowest value far any R. With such a high percentag e of 
n~v firms, most of the change can be attributed to the entry of these 
firms . This is borne out when we consider that those firms which re-
mained in the group over this forty-year period were probably quite 
strong, so that their rank ch9.nges were not great . The railroads, of 
course, are an exception to the latter statement. Al though many of 
them lasted the period, they lost rank. However, U. s. Steel, which 
was third largest in 1949, lost only two ranlcs, for it was first in 
1909. 
Betvreen 1909-1919 and 1919-1929, there was a difference of 
plus three percentage points and minus eight correlation p o:LYJ.ts . This 
seems to indicate that the difference in the R values is pr:Lmarily a 
result of changing positions of the old firms. This could have been 
caused, partially, by the nevv firms entering into the higher rank 
classes (1-50). Of course, if a given nu.rn.ber of nff•'f firms enter high-
er rank classes, they vfill have more effect on R than a larger group 
of new firms entering into the 130-150 rank classes. If we recall 
t hat in the 1919-1929 period, there was a spurt of mergers and holding-
company growth, it becomes obvious that the nevv firms of this period, 
although smaller in number, had a greater effect on the R value because 
they were large new firms . 
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The period of 1929-1939 indicates a greater stability among 
the large corporations with fewer nmi firms than in the preceding 
period. The difference in percentage points is equal to the differ-
ence in R points between 1919-1929 and 1929-1939. Thus it appears 
that the nmr firms had relatively little effect on the composition 
of the 150 largest in the latter period. Probably, the new firms were 
quite small, occupying the lower ran...1c groups. The firms which dropped 
out were in the higher groups and their raru{S were occupied by other 
old firms. In this way, the rank differences would be minimized. The 
effect of the depression on the composition of the 150 largest seems 
to have been to reduce change and add stability. 
The 1939-1949 period shows a plus 7% and minus 3 R points 
in comparison to the 1929-1939 periods. This would indicate that al-
t hough more nmv firms entered during this period, they were grouped 
in the lrrfler classes. 
B. Technique Used to Determine Changes in the Composition 
of the 150 Largest Corporations by Industrial Groups. 
Although we used correlation to show changes for the total 
corporate movements of the 150 largest, we can~ot use this method in 
analyzing the changes for the classifications. The use of correlation 
implies that the number of items are held constant for each observa-
tion. This requirement was met by the total 150, but the number of 
firms in each classification has been allowed to vary. As was noted 
before, while the percentages of new firms and old firms can roughly 
measure changes, the only changes that are included are compositional 
changes. Positional or rank changes are i gnored . 
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As has been stated earlier, the industrial classifications 
used in this study are those used in Moody's Security Manuals. The 
150 firms have been broken down into three groups: Industrials, 
Public Utilities, and Railroads. 
The first step was to determine the number of firms in each 
classif ication for each observation. These data are sho~fll in Table v. 
Table V - Number of Firms in Each Category of the 150 Largest Corpor-
a t ions :Ln. the United States, 1909-1949, by Decades. 
1909 1919 1929 1939 1949 
Industrials 41 67 53 49 75 
Public Utilities l4 34 54 59 43-
Railroads 95 49 43 42 32 
Totals 150 150 150 150 150 
Table VI - Number of Firms Which are Nevr in the 150 IP.rgest Corpora-
tions in the United States, 1909-1949~ by Decades. 
1909 l909 1919 1929 1939 
-- --1949 1919 1929 1939 1949 
Industrials 49 39 24 15 34 
Public Utilities 40 26 44 25 20 
RaiJroads 0 7 9 4 0 
Totals 89 72 77 44 54 
Table VII - Number of Firms viihich Have Dropped Out of the 150 Largest 
Corporations in the United States, 1909-1949, by Decades. 
1909 1909 1919 1929 1939 
--1949 1919 1929 1939 1949 
Industrials 15 13 38 19 8 
Public Utilities 11 6 24 20 36 
Railroads 63 53 15 5 10 
Totals 89 72 77 44 54 
Source: Moody's Investment Service. 
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Next, the number of new· firms had had to be determined. 
This could not be done by simple subtraction because the net differen-
ces between observations were not only a result of new firms entering, 
but, also, of old firms dropping out. For instance, in Table V, we 
see that the difference in the number of industrials between 1909 and 
1945 was 34. In Table VI, which shows the number of new· firms taken 
from the original data, we see tl1at the actual number of firms which 
existed in 1949, that didn't exist in 1909, is 49. If added to the 
1909 figure in Table V, they wou~d give the number of industrials for 
1949 as 90, considerably in excess of the true figure. The reason for 
the discrepancy is that some of the firms which existed in 1909, no 
longer existed in 1949. These firms, which had dropped out, are shown 
in Table VII. They were computed by subtracting the number of ne-« firms 
which came into being over a period of time, from the total number of 
firms existing in the later year of the comparison period. This was 
the net figure. If it was lower than the total figure for the earlier 
year in the comparison, some firms had dropped out. The number of the 
firms which had dropped out was computed by subtracting the net increase 
of firms from the total number of firms in the earlier year. A;n example 
might clarify this procedure. The total number of industrials in 1909 
was 41, and in 1949 was 75. The number of new firms which existed in 
1949, but not in 1909, was 49. By subtracting 49 from 75, we discover 
that 26 firms existed in 1949 that also existed in 1909. This seems 
that 15 firms had dropped out over the period (41-26). 
48. 
V. .Analysis and Synthesis. 
The forty-year period which has been covered in our observa-
tions can be roughly broken dovv.n into three sub-periods. The periods 
of 1909-1919 and 1939-1949 can be considered as war-time periods, while 
1919-1929 can be thought of as a prosperity period characterized by 
the culmination of the merger movement. The 1929-1939 period is remem-
bered by most of us as a depression period. During this depression, 
legislation such as the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1934, and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1933, was passed which had a profoand 
effect upon business. 
Such a classification of time periods presents some rather 
serious problems. If we were to follow this system rigidly, we would 
be committing the prime folly of i gnoring the history of economic 
development. For example, the merger movement reached its peak in the 
1919-1929 period. However, it undoubtedly had a contributory role in 
the large scale liquidation which took place in the thirties. Not 
only that, but the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1934 was a 
result of occurrences in the twenties. This same piece of legislation 
was the cause of the breakdown of certain firms in the 1939-1949 period. 
Again, the effect of war is not over when an armistice has 
been signed. There are those who clai~ that we are still paying for, 
and, hence, still feeling the economic effects of, the American 
Revolution. While this may not be a valid example, most of us can 
recall the effect that World War II had on such economic variables as 
price levels, employment, and investment long after V-J Day. 
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It is extremely easy ·to list examples of the continuity 
of effect of economic phenomena, ad infinitum. It should be obviouB 
by noYv that we cannot segregate the happenings of a ten-year period 
and treat them independently of all antecedent and posterior occur-
rences. To overcome some of this difficulty and still roughly retain 
the above classification of periods, we shall study the period 1909-
1949 as a separate part of the classification. 
Following the analysis, we shall attempt to synthesize this 
study vnth the related portions of the body of economic doctrines. 
A. 1909-1949 . 
1. The Industrial Group . 
In t erms of deflated asset values (see Table III (B)), the 
industrial group in 1949 was, approximately, 3.5 times its size in 
1909. Of the 150 largest corporations in 1909, 41 were L~ the indus-
trial group. By 19~-9, 75 of the 150 largest were industrial corpora-
tions (see Table V). Sixty-five percent of the industrial firms in 
the 1949 list were not among the 150 largest corporations in 1909. 
In other words, the L~dustrial group has shovm not only a 
terrifi c increase over the forty-year period, both in asset values and 
in number of large firm~s, but there has been an even more impressive 
irt_flux of new firms. The mortality rate of large industrials, while 
not as impressive as the influx of new firms, is significant. Ti"fenty-
five percent of the largest industrials in 1909 were not included in 
our list for 1949 (see Table VII ). 
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vVhen we consider the growth of but one industry, and i ts 
effect on allied industries, over this period, there is no doubt that 
the primary cause of this impressive change has been innovat ion. For 
exa~ple, we shall use the automobile industry, and specifically the 
General Motors Corporation. 
In 1909, General Motors did not exist. By 1919, after a fevi 
short years of existence, it ·was the 29th largest firms in the United 
states. It was the 7th largest corporation in 1929, the 6th largest in 
1939, and, by 1949, it was the 2nd largest corporation in the United 
States (see Appendix A) . If we look at this development in the large, 
i . e., from the poL~t of viewi of the development of the gasoline-powered, 
internal combustion engine, it becomes .obvious that the growth and 
prosperity of the petroleum industry is due, to no mean extent, to 
this innova~ion. The ramifications of the effect of the development 
of this innovation are impossible to measure. Let us merely point out 
t hat the automobile companies are among the laxgest users of steel and 
steel products, of rubber, of electrical equipment, etc., and that 
miles upon miles of road have been built and nm"i industries such as 
the automobile service shops, roadside restaurants, and motels, have 
been developed as a result of the wide-spread use of the automobile. 
The type of growth as exemplified by the automobile indus-
try, and, for that matter, the radio and chemical industries, would 
seem to cast serious doubt on the assertions of those who believe that 
a ncorporate systemtt exists . u. S. Steel would be, and I believe is, 
the classic example used by those who share the latter belief . They 
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would point out in support of their claims that U. S. Steel was among 
the five largest corporations in the U~ited States in both 1909 and 
1949. However, there are ready rejoinders to this accusation. 
In the first place, the United States Steel Corporation in 
1909 had about as much water in its balance sheet as there is in the 
A:t,lantic Ocean. The House of Morgan promoted this company out of thin 
air and promises . Shares of stock were given away as gratuities at 
the slightest excuse. There is no doubt that if the 1909 assets of 
U. S . Steel were given at true value, U. s . Steel would lose its 
eminent position among the largest corporations in 1909. Shortly after 
its birth, u. S. Steel was a solvent firm and had squee~ed most of the 
water out of its balance sheet. Yet, despite the adroit manipulations 
of its promoters, U. S. Steel probably would have foundered--as have 
many firms 1vith considerably more auspicious inceptions--had there not 
been a real demand for steel. This demand was partially the result of 
the buildup of armaments in Europe and World War I. But, the develop-
ment of the automobile industry and its consequent demand for steel 
played no small part in the growth of U. S. Steel. 
This leads us to the second argument. U. S . Steel has re-
mained large not th~ough monopolistic practices (The price of steel has 
gone dmm over ti.rne and the quantity produced has increased) but perh..aps 
rather because of a continually increasing demand for its product. 
This has developed as the proportion of capital goods has increased 
throughout all industry. For instance, agriculture, which we usually 
think of as a low capital goods industry, has become increasjngly more 
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mechanized over time and almost all of the new agricultural machinery 
is made primarily of steel. 
Of course., we do not claim that U. S. Steel and corporations 
of a simila~ nattiTe are not guilty, at least at times, of restrictive 
practices of a "monopolistic" nature which, if practised frequently 
enough, might lead to a "corporate system.n It seems obvious t hough, 
t hat the huge corporations like U. S. Steel, General Motors, Sacony-
Vacuum Oil, etc., are dominant corporations because they are producing 
products which are in high demand. Monopolistic practices may aid 
in maintaining corporate positions for a time, but without adequate 
demand, these practices will act merely as temporary dikes against the 
flood of i..nnovationl~. 
The Pullman Company, which is a kind of monopoly, was the 
56th largest firm in 1909 (see ~ppendix A). In 1949, it wasn't even 
among the 150 largest corporations. Surely, if monopolistic potenti-
alities were sufficient to maintain a corporation 1 s position, the 
Pullman Company is in at least as good a position as U. S. Steel for 
utilizing the restrictive practices. Perhaps, it will be more accurate 
to say that because corporations are powerful, they are in a position 
to exert their powers in a restrictive or nmonopolisticu manner. 
To sum up, it is our belief that large corporat ions become, 
and remain, large as a result of innovation, and their monopolistic 
position is a result, not a cause, of their being large . These argu-
ments hold eq~lly well for the other industrial classification groups • 
.;:- 2, circa p . 80 
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2. Public Utility Group . 
From 1909-1949, asset values of the public utilities gr~f 
by approximately seven times. While there were only Jl~ public util-
i ties among the 150 giants in 1909, there were 43 in 1949, a growth 
of about three-fold. Of the 14 which were on the list in 1909, only 
three were still among the largest in 1949. In other words, over 95%; 
of the largest public utilities in 1949 had not been among the largest 
in 1909. 
On the surface, it would appear that the reason for this 
growth is not similar to t he r eason for the growth of industrial cor-
porations . 'iJhile t he development of nevv products and markets is quite 
str i king as the basic reason for the grmvth of li1dustrials, it seems 
that mergers, i.e. the combining of firms, is the cause of the increase 
in the number of public utilities. 
Some facts belie this conclusion. Tvrenty-one percent of the 
public utility corporations in the group in 1909 were power companies. 
By 1949, this proportion had increased to 44 percent. Obviously, such 
an increase is due to something other than mergers. The development 
of industrial machinery needing electric power, the electrification of 
the homes in the greater part of the United States; --these t hings had 
more to do with the growth of the public utilities industry than had 
megalomaniacs such as Samuel Insull. 
Yet, we would be sadly remiss were we to fail to recognize 
the effect of mergers on the grovrth of the public utility group. This, 
too, comes ·within the fold of development caused by innovation. 
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In the first place, the development of those oversiz.ed 
behemoths created by men like Insull, may be ignored at this point . 
Those that survived the debacle of the thirties are no longer impor-
tant. This is the result of the Public Utility Holding Company Act 
of 1934 which only permits the atistence of integrated holding 
companies. 
There were other, less spectacular, combinations of public 
utilities which are of far greater economic significance L~ the long-
run. During the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries, 
-w-lth the exception of commur1ication companies such as the MacKay 
Companies and metropolitan transportation firms s uch as the Brooklyn 
Rapid Transit Company, public utilities vrere mainly local, one-horse 
outfits servicing small tovms. It was not uncommon to have more than 
on e supplier of a utility, such as telephone service, in a single town. 
Remnants of such systems are still to be found in certain areas of 
Texas, while San Francisco suffers under the effects of a duplication 
of local transportation service to this day. The latter instances 
are clearly anachronisms as the reader well knows. The process of 
eliminating wasteful, uneconomical duplication of services involved 
mergers. 
The nffi'r firms, resulting from the mergers, often grew suffi-
ciently large to enter the group of the 150 largest corporations. Such 
was the case with the Commonwealth Edison Company and many others. The 
men who effected these combinations, served a useful purpose, and are 
as worthy of being considered innovators as are men like Henry Ford and 
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Alexander Graham Bell. The fact that, later, they used their profits 
and entrepreneurial abilities to spawn blo1vn-up combinations such as 
the lbnerican Super-Power Corporation, which contributed to the insta-
bility of the economy, is irrelevant to the argument at this point . 
Thus, while much of the growth of public utilities has been 
due to combinations, these same combinations have been due to the 
effects of innovation in terms of: new products, i .e. the demand for 
power; a new business form, i.e. the combining of firms for efficien-
cy's sake; and the urbanization of the population, which was, itself, 
caused by innovations. 
Thus, when we observe the development of public utilities, 
we are witnessing, once again, the results of the driving force of 
capitalism, which is also capitalism's main characteristic, and which 
Professor Schumpeter has aptly dubbed Innovation. 
3. The Railroads. 
In terms of real asset values, the railroads included among 
the 150 largest corporations, decreased from $26,ooo,ooo,ooo in 1909 
to $14,ooo,ooo,ooo in 1949, a decrease of abnost 43 percent (see 
Table III (B) ). At the same time, the number of railroads included 
among the 150 largest corporations diminished by 68 percent; from 95 
in 1909 to 32 in 1949 (see Table V). There were no railroads in 1949 
tbat hadn 1t been in existence in 1909 (see Table VI), which means that 
63 railroad companies had dropped from the list over the 40-yeax period. 
At first blush, it would seem that in this case, we bave an 
example of a stagnating industry which bas reached the declining stage. 
56. 
\ihile such an analysis is not false, it is not completely true either. 
One needs only to recall the crippling effects on the economy of the 
railroad striki:r ;Ln Februa.ry 1951, to be convinced that the railroad 
industry is still quite potent. The stagnation analysis, which vrou~d 
include mention of substitute services such as trucks and airplanes, 
is f urther vitiated when we consider the relatively insignificant ef-
fect of a truck or plane stri..l.{e. 
By the beginning of the '11ventieth Century, the rate of exter-
nal growth of the railroad industry had become almost nil. This is, 
partially, evidenced by the fact that no new firms entered the railroad 
group from 1909 to 1949. This would seem to be an exception to our 
argument that innovation has been the prime lever of economic change . 
If the gro¥rth of industrials and public utilities has been due to 
innovation, why hasntt the railroad industr>J felt some of the impact 
of the effects of innovation on the other t wo group s? vTI1y didn tt the 
railroad industry expand under the increased industrial demand for rail 
services, as the public utilitie s expanded under the increased indus-
trial demand f or power? 
The ansvrer to thes e questions is not to be f ound i..11 t he 
data presented in this study. Instead, we must turn to economic 
history and the nat ure of the industry for our anSW"ers. During the 
nineteenth century, railroads were important in two vvays. First, as 
is the case today, they produced a vital s ervice--transportation. 
Second, they were the largest outl et for investment goods. The latter 
statement is no longer true, and here, vre have part of our answ·er • . 
During the period of great investment in the railroad industry, the 
industry over-expanded. The railroad, itself, was an innovation and, 
under the enthusiasm caused by the spectacular profits of innovation 
and speculation, rails were pushed over mountains and across rivers, 
into lands where there was insufficient demand for the r oads . Vrhen 
a pebble is thr~rn into a placid pool, bubbles rise to the surface. 
Much of the development of the railroads may be likened to bubbles 
caused by the pebble of innovation. 
Occasionally, these bubbl es burst, as bubbles will, and the 
economy experienced npanics" and ttcrises . u By and large, though, the 
innovations of secondary order, inspired and made possible by the 
primary innovation of the railroads, the economic development of what 
had been the country's hinterland, developed rapidly enough to fill 
in the lack of demand . In other words, as industries moved West, they 
created a demand f or a commodity which had been in oversupply. 
A further explanation is to be found in the character of the 
railroad industry. Once a line is laid, any number of trains may pass 
over it. As industries grew· and needed more rail service, existing 
railroad companies simply ran more cars over the same tracks. The 
problem of congestion does not occl~ because of lack of track, but 
because of crmvded switching points and terminals . Such a problem has 
existed in the Middle West for the past decade. It is interesting to 
note that Ohio proposes to build a 300-mile conveyor belt to shQ~t off 
coal and iron ore from over-crowded terminals and switches . This pro-
posed belt would be an irL~ovation arising from the L~adequacies of the 
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railroad network. A. similar example is to be found in the trucking 
L~dustry which has developed because it has a product which is, in 
many ways, superior to rail service. 
Not all rail companies experienced the necessary increase in 
demand. ~\s a result, small firms, finding themselves in difficulty, 
merged with larger firms. This accounts for the increase in size and, 
partially, for the decline in numbers of the railroads in our group . 
However, it seems probable that the I.c.c. has broken up as many com-
binations as it has permitted. This, too, helps account for the dis-
appearance of firms from the 150 largest. 
Probably more important than any of the above reasons, as a 
cause for the decrease in the number of railroads, has slinply been that 
·the growth of public utilities and industrial firms J:-!.ave outstripped 
the railroads. Thus it is seen that, even in the case of railroads, 
the effects of innovation have been a prime cause for the changes which 
took place in the industry. Undoubtedly, the railroad industry is 
stagnant and, perhaps, even declining. If this is so, it is a result 
of superior services forcing the railroads dmvn. To put it -in 
Schumpeterian terms, we would have an ff'.£ample of an innovation causing 
Creative Destruction. 
B. The Shorter Periods . 
In the last section, we dealt, at moderate length, Yfith the 
movements of the 150 largest corporations over the forty-year period, 
1909-1949. Although the reader still may not be convinced of the 
validity of the dominant role which we have assigned to innovation, 
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surely he must be impressed by the way the theory of innovation seems 
to fit the facts of economic history. 
As we look at the shorter periods, there will appear to be 
devi_ations where the theory seems invalidated. Much of this is due 
to the fact that major innovations are not accomplished overnight. The 
impact of the automobile is still being felt as areas try to solve 
traffic congestion. 
Other factors, such as over-investment, poor judgment and 
speculation, fiscal policies, etc. are the apparent causes of the 
shorter movements. However, further investigation shows that these 
movements, called movements internal to the workings of the economy, 
are, themselves, results of innovation*• 
The effects of factors external to the workings of the 
economy, are not meant to be eA~lained by the SchQmpeterian Theory. 
These things are treated as data, ·which is refreshingly more realis-
tic than the all-pervasive exploitation and expropriation theory of 
Marx. We find no attempt on Schumpeter 1 s part to explain all things 
to all men1Hc. 
1. The 'iVar Periods 1909-1919 and 1939-1949. 
Despite opinion to the contrary*iHf-, it is our feeling that 
war is completely mLnecessary for the functioning of capitalism. For 
instance, Marx cannot envisage capitalism without wars*ir-:::-. 
* 2, Chap. IV, pp . 130-192. Also, 2, Chaps. 2, 3, and 4, pp . 9-21. 
~} 7, pp. 49-54. The entire statement is a masterful criticism of 
Marx and is worth the reading. pp . 3-58. 
?H<~l- See references in 3, pp. 89-90. 
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Considering that productivity declines during wars--as a result of 
the employment of sub-marginal workers, equipment, and plants, and 
that the development of such inno\~tions as radio, automobiles, plas-
tics, etc., had little to do with war in their early stages--it seems 
more likely that the fruits of war are more likely to be death des-
truction, and destitution than the brilliant achievements of 
capitalism. 
a. 1909-1919. 
Total, deflated asset values decreased by about 14 percent 
from 1909-1919. This was prL~rily caused by the 30 percent decline 
in railroads, but was aided by the fact that the industrials and 
public utilities showed t heir smallest rate of increase over the 
forty-year period. The latter increased by less than fifty percent 
(50%), while the former's rate of increase was about twenty percent 
(20%). (See Table III). 
The number of industrials included among the 150 largest 
showed a net increase (new firms less firms which had dropped out--
see Tables VI and VII) of twenty-six firms; the public utilities, a 
net increase of twenty firms; while the railroads showed a net de-
crease of forty-six firms. 
b. 1939-1949. 
During the 1939-1949 period, total deflated asset values de-
creased by about thirty-four (34%) percent. With the exception of 
the industrials, the asset values of the other industrial groups de-
·clined; public utilities by about eighteen percent (18%); and the 
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railroads by fifty-one (51~6 ) percent. The industrial group had their 
smallest rate of growth-four percent (4%) --over the entire forty-year 
period. 
The number of industrial firms included in the list, shmved 
a net increase of twenty- six firms over the 1939-1949 period. However, 
public utilities decreased by sixteen firms, and railroads by ten . 
c. Analysis of t he war periods. 
It s eems obvious that war causes a decl ine in asset values . 
Tl:.e effects of war are more clearly shovm, in terms of asset values 
and net increase of f i rms , during the World War II period t han that 
of World War I. This fact i s probably due to the greater l ength of 
t he r ecent wru~ and our greater participation in it. 
The difficulties of r eplacement and the general conditions 
of short-suppl y seem the most l ogical reasons f or the decline i n asset 
values . Tied i n with this are the factors of high prices and the 
general uncertain outlook for the postwar period . The latter factors 
are important only i n the consideration of the 1939-1949 period . ~he 
changes in number of firms are not significant during the decade . 
These have been treated in the section concerned vfith the entire 
forty- year span . 
However, it is wise to treat the public utilities separate-
l y . Their decline in 1939-1949 had nothing to do with the war . The 
Public Utility Holding Company act of 1934 was the cause for the de-
crease. Its .full impact wasn 1t felt until the 1939-1949 period, and 
it was the breakdown of public utility holding companies as a result 
of this act, which caused a diminution of the public utilities in 19!~9 . 
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To sum up, the effects of war upon the largest corporations 
is to decrease the asset values--or to decrease the rate of increase 
of asset values--because of the difficulties of replacement. The un-
certainties of the future and the high pric e level played their parts 
in the decline of asset values during the 1939-1949 decade. 
2. The Prosperity Period: 1919-1929. 
There can be little doubt that the 1919-1929 period was a 
decade of prosperity. Total deflated assets increased by approxi-
WAtely 220%. Al l of the component groups increased. The public util-
ities had the greatest rate of i ncrease--roughly 600?b--Yil"hile industri-
als more than doubled and r ailroads increased by about half t heir 
size at the beginning of the period. 
In terms of the number of firms included, public utilities 
showed a net increase of t wenty firms, while the i ndustrials grmv by 
fourteen, and the railroads, six. 
Obviously, this was the heyday for the public utilities. 
The gi gantic grovvth of massive, oversized monsters dominated the f ield . 
All corporations gr evv, but the publ ic utilities grevv far mor e r apidly 
t han the rest . This, t hen, is the explanation of the change composi-
t ion of our group. The grm•rth of public utilities did not halt at 
the end of the decade , but continued into the decade of the thirties. 
The r eaction against the growth of the public util ity holding company 
did not, as we have said, have any significant impact until t he f or ties. 
This was not a period of monopolies (the pluralization of 
which is contrary to its definition), but an overgrowt h of all f irms. 
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It vras based on innovations in the automobile and radio industries, 
among others. The entire decade, or more specif ically, from 1922 on, 
may be considered as a period at the top of the cycle where optimism 
is the order of the day, and nothing is impossibl~~. Such a period 
f'ollmmd the end of the Civil War, and in the thirties we had the same 
result that our grandfathers had in 1873. Many mistakes were made 
during this per iod, and they came home to roost in the thirties. 
3. Depression: 1929-1939. 
During the 1929-1939 decade, the asset values of the 150 
largest corporations increased by about 37%. All of the groups showed 
increase. The public utilities, again, had the largest rate of in-
crease--sixty-five percent (65%)--while industrials grEWr by about 
t11renty-one percent (21%), and railroads, by nineteen percent (19%) . 
Five public utilities entered the group of 150 corporations 
from 1929-1939, while four industrials and one railroad dropped out. 
This slight change in composition, probably, reflects the persistent 
ef'fect of the merger movement which, as we have seen, was most inf'lu-
ential among the public utilities. 
But the increase in asset values during this period of' 
great depression is quite another matter . There is little doubt that 
most f'irms declined during this dismal decade. Yet, we find that the 
150 largest firms increased. Obviously, because of the economic 
climate, the increase was not due to healthy expru1sion of business on 
* 2, pp. 145-148 and 3, pp. 12-13. 
64. 
the part of the 150 largest corporations. Indeed, most of the i n-
crease probabl y came from the gobbling up of smaller firms by larger 
firms . I s this, then, a case where the theory of innovation breaks 
down? 
It would be ridiculous to say that a theory breaks down in 
a situation where it plainly doesn't apply. There vms no major inno-
vation during the thirties except those labor-saving devices which 
were not very numerous in the first place, and had no effect on the 
economic process as they called for little investment. This decade 
exemplified what has been called by Schumpeter, Mass Liquidation . He 
explicitly states that such a period is not at all essential in the 
evolution of capitalism, but, rather, is a result of poor judgment 
&J.d. panic on the part of those who were caught up in the secondary 
wav~~ . This s econdary wave is merel y a r eflection of the eA~berance 
caused by the primar y wave of innovation. The secondary wave has no 
claim. to existence in its oYm r i ght . 
This seems to demonstrate, albeit in a negative manner, the 
impor tance of innovation in the evolution of the capitalistic system. 
Without innovation, large firms would grow larger, as they did during 
the thirties, and the result, as any Marxist would be more than v>Till-
ing to demonstre.te, this would logically lead to the breakdown of the 
capitalistic system. 
c. Synthesis 
Throughout this study, we have attempted to show t he impor-
?,(. 2, pp . 1.48-150 and 3, p. 13. 
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tance of innovation. The proofs of the effects of innovation, which 
we have demonstrated, are hardly conclusive. However, they definite-
ly are proofs, albeit of a limited nature. 
The time has come to conclude this thesis by linking it up 
-vdth the established corpus of economic doctrine . This synthesis 
vvill not be as extensive as it, perhaps, should be. It is more an 
expression of oux con~_ction that synthesis should be the aim of all 
economists and, indeed, of all social scientists. 
By now, the reader must be aware that we have followed 
along the path blazed by Joseph Schumpeter. This was not a pre-
conception on our part . If anything, at the beginning of this thesis, 
we were extremely critical of the innovation theory. However, the 
data and related economic history seem to indicate that the innova-
tion theory is the most accurate. 
Among other theorists who present dynamic concepts of 
economic development, the only significant one is Karl Marx. Insofar 
as the Marxists are concerned, their theor-y- simply didn 1t stand up 
m1der this investigation. There is no tendency for large firms to 
expropriate other firms until all capitalist interests become coalesced 
into one huge corporation. Looking at the forty-year period as a 
whole, capitalism does not seem to be on the wane . Of course, this is 
an historical study and we make no claims f or the continuation of 
capitalism into the distant futuxe. 
From time to time we have used Berle and Means as scapegoats. 
As they based their study on data similar to ours, they were convenient 
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for purposes of criticism. Beside this, we feel that th~ allowed 
themselves to be overly affected by the economic climate of the 
thirties. The conclusions of Berle and Means are compatible with 
Marxist theory despite the fact t hat we are sure that neither of 
these writers consider themselves as Marxists. For instance, th~ 
SA~rapolated a rate of grmvth based on the 1919-1929 period to dem-
onstrate that, in 360 years, the 200 largest corporations would 
have merged into a single corporation~~. Th~ go on to say that this 
is an unwarranted extension of their data, which it certainly is, 
but they make the conclusion based on this extension, that tl1e 200 
largest corporations will remain large for a long period of time. 
Surely, if a method is unwarranted, so is the conclusion drawn from 
it. 
There is another group of economists who very loudly 
profess no theory at all, and indeed, are anti-theoretical. Their 
main charge against theory is that it is nothing but a statement of 
logical relationships 1vith no support except air. They would have 
data to support all clai1Jl.S. We believe that Appendix A pres ents the 
basic data which justify our analysis and conclusions. 
It is fitting, vre think, to close this study with a 
sentence that appeared on the first page . It is a pilot study--
merely a beginning--and no profound conclusions should be deduced 
from it . 
'i.· 5, P• 44. 
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APPE:NDIX A - The 150 Largest Corporations, 1909-1949, by Decades. 
1909 
Industrials 
Allis-Chalmers Co. 
Amal gamated Copper Co. 
American Agricultural Chemical Co. 
American Can Co . 
American Car and Foundry Co. 
American Locomotive Co. 
~nerican Smelting and Refining Co. 
~~erican Sugar Refining Co. 
knerican Tobacco Co. 
~nerican Woolen Co. 
Atlantic, Gulf and West Indies 
Steamship Lines 
Bethlehem Steel Corp. 
Cambria Steel Co. 
Central Leather Co. 
Colorado Fuel and Iron Co. 
Corn Products Refining Co. 
Crucible Steel Co . of America 
Distillers Securities Corp. 
DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. 
General Electric 
International Harvester Co. 
International Mercantile Marine Co . 
International Paper Co. 
Lackawanna Steel Co. 
Lake Superior Corp . (iron & steel) 
Lehigh Coal and Navigat ion Co. 
National Biscuit Co. 
National Lead Co . 
Pittsburgh Coal Co. 
J?UJ.lrP..an Co • 
Quincy Mining Co. 
Republic Iron and Steel Co. 
Sears, Roebuck, and Co. 
Swift and Co. 
United States Leather Co. 
United States Rubber Co. 
United States Smelting, Refining 
and Mining Co. 
United States Steel Corp. 
Virginia and Carolina Chemical Co. 
Western Electric Co. 
Westinghouse Electric and Mfg . Co . 
Assets 
$ 54,749.4 
167,2'1{5.0 
56,515.4 
89,010.6 
92,843.3 
71,482.0 
117, Bo2.2 
130,352.2 
282,150.6 
77,605.0 
55,098.6 
58, 893.3 
62,062.5 
109,589.7 
58,628.4 
84,683.8 
52,934.7 
60,369.7 
74,074.3 
99,189.8 
157,608.6 
194,471.9 
69,134.4 
85,434.5 
53,929.4 
45,270.0 
64,821.5 
49,704.3 
107,774.1 
116,173.3 
65,036.3 
64,862:.6 
48,217.0 
101,865.5 
168,529.6 
J.D6,689.5 
49,822.0 
1,764,017.5 
68,26o.9 
51,483.1 
88,481.6 
Total 
Rank 
123 
40 
118 
78 
71 
92 
55 
49 
2l£ 
85 
12~ 
ll2. 
108 
59 
114 
82 
125 
110 
87 
68 
44 
35 
94 
81 
124 
140 
105 
130 
61 
56 
1D3 
JD4 
134 
67 
39 
62 
129 
1 
96 
127 
79 
Group 
Rank 
34 
5 
32 
16 
15 
22_ 
8 
7 
2-: 
20 
33 
30 
28 
10 
31 
19 
36 
29 
21 
14 
6 
3 
23 
18 
35 
41 
27 
39 
11 
9 
2.5 
26 
4o 
13 
4 
12 
3:8 
1 
24 
37 
17 
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APPK~IX ~- The 150 Largest Corporations, 1909-1949, by Decades. 
Public Utilities 
American Telephone and 
Telegraph Co. 
Brookly~ Rapi d Transit Co. 
Commonwealth Edison Co. 
Consolidated Gas Co. 
Interborough and Metropolitan Co. 
I nt erborough Rapid Transit Co. 
Mackay Companies 
:Ma.nha t tan Ry. 
Metropolitan Street Ry. 
New Orleans Ry. and Light Co. 
Pacific Telephone and Telegraph 
Philadelphia Co. 
Western Telephone Co. 
vfestern Union Telegraph Co. 
Railroads 
Allegheny Valley Ry . 
1909 
Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Ry. 
Atlanta, Birmingham, and Atlantic 
Atlantic Coast Line RR. Co. 
Baltimore and Ohi o RR . Co. 
Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Ry. 
Boston and Albany RR . 
Boston and Maine RR. 
Buff alo, Rochester, and 
Pit tsburgh Ry. Co. 
Canadian Northern Ry. Co. 
Canadian Pacific Ry . Co. 
Central of Georgia Ry. Co. 
Central Pacific Ry. 
Central JL~ . of Nmv Jersey 
Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. 
Chicago and Alton RR . Co. 
Chicago, BtiTlington, and Quincy RR. 
Chicago and Eastern Illinois P~. Co. 
Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. 
Chicago, Indiana, and Southern RR. 
Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Ry. 
Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co . 
Chicago, Rock Island, and 
Pacific Ry. Co. 
Assets 
~~566,540.9 
152,618.8 
55,565.7 
140,399.3 
212,559.9 
78,341.2 
92,233.4 
122,323.1 
102,498.1 
65,221.9 
59,524.6 
67,634.0 
56,011.2 
l6o,155.8 
~~ 46,347 . 3 
. 572,163.5 
57,220.8 
212,167.6 
530,248.2 
43,183.0 
47,875.7 
90,396.7 
43,813.4 
108,973.3 
424,068 .• 6 
63,764.5 
230,195.0 
104,876.2 
193,427.9 
126,234.1 
407,704.4 
77,118.9 
122.,404.3 
42,992.0 
379,060.4 
336,916.5 
316,349.6 
Total 
Rank 
6 
45 
120 
48 
32 
84 
73 
53 
66 
102 
111 
99 
119 
41 
136 
5 
ll6 
33 
7 
145 
135 
75 
143 
60 
13 
107 
25 
64 
36 
51 
14 
86 
52 
147 
15 
17 
20 
Group 
Rank 
1 
4 
14 
5 
2 
9 
8 
6 
7 
11 
12 
10 
13 
3 
83 
4 
74 
30 
5 
91 
82 
53 
89 
45 
11 
70 
22 
47 
32 
4o 
12 
58 
41 
93 
1); 
15; 
18 
APPENDJX A - The 150 Largest Corporations, 1909-1949, by Decades. 
Railroads 
Chicago, St. Paul, 1tinnesota 
and Omaha Ry. Co. 
Chicago Terminal Transfer RR . Co. 
Chicago and Western Indiana RR. 
Cincinnati, Hamilton, and 
Dayton Ry . Co. 
Cleveland, Cincinnati, C~icago, 
and st. Louis Ry. Co. 
Colorado and Southern Ry. Co. 
Delaware and Hudson Canal Co. 
Delaware and Hudson Co. 
Delaware, Ls.ckawanna, and 
Western RR . Co. 
1909 
Denver and Rio Grande RR. Co. 
Detroit, Toledo, and Ironton RR. Co. 
Duluth, South Shore, and Atlanta 
Erie RR . Co . 
Fitchburg RR. 
Galveston, Harrisburg and 
San Antonio Ry. 
Great Northern Ry. Co. 
Hocking Valley Ry. Co. 
Illinois Central RR. Co. 
International and Great Northern RR 
Kansas City and Southern Ry. Co. 
I.ake Shore and 'Michigan Southern Ry. 
Lehigh Valley RR. Co. 
Long Island RR. Co. 
Louisville and Nashville RR . Co. 
Mexican Central Ry. Co. 
l\tichigan Central RR . Co. 
Minnesota, St . Paul and Sault 
St. Marie 
Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Ry. Co. 
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
Mobile and Ohio RR. Co. 
Nevv England RR. Co. 
New York Central and Huds on River 
RR. Co. 
N8'N York, Chicago, and St . Louis 
RR. Co. 
Assets 
~~ 71,624.4 
49,568.6 
55,482.0 
89,699.8 
11+1,302.0 
119,722.5 
45,620.4 
115,944.5 
68,090.1 
177,643.3 
45,484.5 
51,459.0 
h93,240.7 
49,050.3 
72,902.2 
524,100.7 
56,562.8 
333,003.2 
44,125.5 
93,576.1 
232,461.2 
158,010.9 
68,236.2 
228,712.9 
217,464.1 
73,273.5 
91,682.9 
204,107.7 
218,657.5 
45,542.9 
42,404.9 
483,428.9 
64,603.3 
Total 
Rank 
91 
131 
121 
76 
47 
54 
137 
57 
98 
37 
139 
128 
9 
133 
89 
8 
117 
18 
141 
69 
24 
42 
97 
26 
30 
88 
74 
34 
29 
138 
149 
11 
106 
Group 
Rank 
62 
79 
76 
54 
38 
42 
84 
h3 
66 
33 
86 
78 
7 
81 
6o 
6 
75 
16 
87 
49 
21 
35 
65 
24 
28 
59 
52 
31 
27 
85 
95 
9 
69 
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APPENDIX A - The 150 Largest Corporations, 1909-1949, by Decades. 
1909 
Railroads 
Nevr York, New Haven, and Hartford 
RR. Co. 
New York, Ontario, and Western RR Co. 
Nevv York, Susquehanna, and Western 
Ry. Co. 
Norfolk and Southern Ry. Co. 
Norfolk and Western Ry. Co. 
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. 
Northwestern Ry. Co. 
North West Pacific RR. Co. 
Old Colony R._-q. 
Pen.nsyl vania Co. 
Pennsylvania RR. Co. 
Pere Marquette RR. Co. 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, and 
Washington RR. Co. 
Philadel pPia and Reading Coal and 
Iron Co. 
Philadelphia and Reading Ry. Co. 
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago 
and St. Lotus Ry. Co. 
Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne, and 
Chicago Ry. Co. 
Reading Co. 
Rock Island Co. 
San Pedro, Los Angeles, and 
Salt Lake R.y . Co. 
Seaboard Air Line Ry. 
Southern Pacific Co. 
Southern Pacific RR. 
Southern Ry. Co. 
St. Louis, Iron Motmtain, and 
Southern Ry. Co. 
St. Louis and San Francisco RR. Co. 
St. Lot1is, Southwestern Ry. Co. 
Ter!Jlinal RR. Association of 
St. Louis 
Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. 
Toledo, St. Louis, and Western RR Co. 
Union Pac-i f' ic RR. Co. 
United Nmv Jersey P.R. and Canal Co. 
Assets 
~~368,498.2 
93,157.0 
43,935.9 
43,641.1 
216,797.1 
593,580.6 
43,101.2 
49,229.8 
42,470.7 
223,314.6 
706,443.1 
l02,6o4.4 
58,107;.2 
89,291.9 
ll0,6o9.8 
129,716.3 
87,092.6 
268,850.8 
150,114.4 
72,386.8 
157' 921.1 
478,727.8 
301,455.4 
486,212.1 
172,158.2 
324,4oo.5 
92,372.2 
41,428.2 
105,635.8 
52,396.1 
731,404.2 
67,223.5 
Total 
Rank 
16 
70 
Jl.J2. 
144 
31 
4 
146 
132 
Jl~8 
27 
3 
65 
115 
77 
58 
5o 
8o 
23 
46 
90 
43 
12 
21 
10 
38 
19 
72 
150 
63 
126 
2 
101 
Group 
Rank 
14 
5o 
88 
90 
29 
3 
92 
80 
94 
25 
2 
48 
73 
55. 
44 
39 
56 
20 
37 
61 
36 
10 
19 
8 
34 
17 
51 
96 
46 
77 
1 
68 
71. 
AP~IDIX A - The 150 Largest Corporations, 1909-1949, by Decades . 
1909 
Railroads 
Wabash and Pittsburgh Terminal Ry. Co. 
w·abash RR . Co. 
Western Maryland RR . Co. 
Western New York and Pennsylvania Ry. 
Wheeling and lake Erie RR. Co . 
uVisconsin Central RR. Co. 
Yazoo and Mississippi Valley RR. Co . 
Industrials 
American Agricultural Chemical Co. 
1\merican Can Co. 
American Car and Foundry Co. 
American Locomotive Co . 
American Ry. Express Co. 
American Smelting and Refining Co . 
~~erican Sugar Refining Co . 
American Tobacco Co . 
American Woolen Co. 
Anaconda Copper 1tiPing Co. 
Armour and Co. 
Associated Oil Co. 
Atlantic, Gulf, and West Indies 
Steamship Lines 
Baldvf.in Locomotive Works 
Bethlehem Steel Corp. 
Calmnet and Hecla :M"..ining Co. 
Central Leather Co . 
Chile Copper Co. 
Colorado Fuel and Iron Co. 
Consolidation Coal Co. 
Corn Products Refining Co . 
Crucible Steel Co. of America 
Cuba Cane Sugar Corp. 
Cudahy Packing Co . 
Deere and Co . 
Dominion Steel Corp. 
East:rnan Kodak Co. 
Assets 
$68, 601 .1 
220,559.0 
84,425.5 
61,145.8 
67,353.4 
69,611.5 
58,826.1 
~?102, 365.3 
JlJ~ , 865.0 
127,223 . 8 
91,544.5 
83,201.8 
221,886.1 
142,185.2 
191,292.0 
124,123.0 
237,203.7 
4o4,286.L~ 
83,580.1 
102,837.1 
77,521.9 
}97,005.8 
89,600.1 
146,5o5.o 
149,841.0 
100,132.6 
129,860.6 
129,582.8 
112,435.5 
95,274.2 
88,081.2 
84,605.5 
95,910 .6 
76,648.1 
Total 
Rank 
--
95 
28 
83 
109 
100 
93 
113 
105 
63 
77 
116 
135 
43 
64 
47 
83 
38 
23 
134 
103 ~ ' 
141 
24 
119 
60 
57 
707 
72 
73 
92 
112 
125 
132 
111 
142 
Group 
Rank 
64 
26 
57 
71 
67 
6J. 
72 
42 
22 
32 
49 
61 
11 
23 
13 
34 
10 
2 
60 
40 
63 
3 
5o 
19 
18 
43 
27 
28 
36 
46 
53 
58 
45 
64 
72. 
APPE}IDIX A - The 150 Largest Corporations, 1909-1949, by Decades. 
Industrials 
F. 1JV. Woolworth Co. 
General Electric Co. 
General Motors Co. 
B. F. Goodrich Co. 
Goodyeax Tire and Rubber Co. 
Great Northern Iron Ore Properties 
Gull Oil Corp. 
International Harvester Co. 
International Mercantile Marine Co. 
International Paper Co. 
Kennecott Copper Corp. 
IP.ckawanna Steel Co. 
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Co. 
liggett and Myers Tobacco Co. 
Mexican Petroleum Co. of Delaware 
Midvale Steel and Ordinance Co. 
Morris and Co. 
National Biscuit Co. 
Ohio Oil Co. 
Phelps-Dodge Corp. 
Pittsburgh Coal Co. 
P. Lorillard Co. 
Pullman Company 
Republic Iron and Steel Co. 
Sinclair Oil and Refining Co. 
St andard Oil of California 
Standard Oil of Indiana 
Steel and Tube Co. of America 
Studebaker Corp. 
The Texas Co. 
Union Oil Co. of California 
United Fruit Co. 
United Shoe Machinery Corp. 
United States Steel Co. 
Utah Copper Co. 
Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. 
Western Electric Co. 
Yfesti nghouse Electric and Mi'g . Co. 
Willys-Overland Co. 
Wil son and Co. 
1919 
Assets 
$ 88,567.6 
268,106.6 
299,489.3 
141,238.4 
93,619.0 
102,734.9 
173,175.6 
283,219.0 
243,258.2 
84,753.0 
133,823.1 
111,936.5 
84,869.7 
130,085.1 
88,499.9 
286,710.2 
112,225.4 
75,388.6 
85,309.4 
241,LJ2.4 
164,332.6 
83,640.2 
189,813.3 
128,734.2 
94,569.5 
145,231.3 
145,428.0 
97,545.8 
74,673.9 
191,591.5 
80,221.1 
127,622.3 
76,159.4 
2,571,617.2 
88,039.4 
107,443.9 
ll8,456.9 
184,893.5 
124,595.6 
129,155.2 
Total 
Rank 
120 
35 
29 
67 
114 
104 
53 
33 
36 
131 
69 
95 
130 
71 
121 
32 
93 
146 
120 
37 
54 
133, 
48 
75 
113 
62 
61 
110 
148 
46 
138 
76 
144 
1 
126 
100 
88 
49 
82 
74 
Group 
Rank 
51 
7 
4 
24 
48 
41 
16 
6 
8 
57 
25 
38 
56 
26 
52 
5 
37 
66 
55 
9 
17 
59 
14 
30 
47 
21 
20 
44 
67 
12 
62 
31 
65 
1 
54 
39 
35 
15 
33~: 
29 
73, 
APPENDIX A - The 150 Largest Corporations, 1909-1949, by Decades . 
Public Utilities 
American Telephone & Telegraph 
Boston Elevated RR . Co. 
Brooklyn Rapid Transit Co. 
· Chice.go Eleva. ted RR. 
Chicago R'R. . Co. 
Cities Ser~nce Co. 
Col~~bia Gas and Electric Co. 
Commonwealth Edison Co. 
Consolidated Gas Co. of New York 
Hudson and Manhattan RR. 
Inter borough Consolidated Corp . 
The MacKay Companies 
Montana Power Co. 
Montreal, .Light, Heat, and Power Co. 
New Orleans Ry. and Light Co. 
New York Edison Co. 
Nevv York RR . Co. 
Ohio Cities Gas Co. 
Pacific El ectric Ry. Co. 
Pacific Gas and Electric Co. 
People t s Gas Light a.."ld Coke Co. 
Philadelphia Co. 
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co. 
Public Service Corp. of New Jers ey 
Public Service RR . Co . 
Puget Sound Traction, Light & 
Power Co. 
Southern California Edison Co. 
Spring Valley Water Co. 
· Third Avenue RR. Co. 
United RR. of San Francisco 
United RR. Co. of St. Louis 
United Rys. and Elec. Co . of 
Baltimore, Md. 
Western Union Telegraph Co. 
Railroads 
Assets 
$1,276,503.5 
111,278.6 
225,760.9 
98,174~9 
110,946.3 
438,700.2 
72,961.1 
122,114.6 
177,307.9 
126,085.2 
125,546.4 
93,304.6 
100,597.6 
76,374.3 
75,340.8 
178,012.6 
90,001.1 
120, 850 .3 
112,109.1 
159,183.5 
111,283.2 
109,373.9 
123,416.9 
123,896.5 
103,949.7 
85,400.3 
88,499.~. 
79,769.3 
87,98o.4 
88,434.5 
106,689.5 
91,062.4 
218,743.1 
.A,tchison, Topeka and Santa Fe RR .• Co. ~~890,627. 7 
Atlantic Coast Line RR. Co . . 291,283.5 
Baltimore and Ohio &~ . Co. 842,339.4 
Total 
Rank 
3 
97 
4o 
109 
98 
20 
149 
86 
52 
79 
80 
ll5 
106 
143 
147 
51 
118 
87 
9L~ 
56 
96 
99 
85 
84 
102 
128 
12a 
14o 
127 
123 
101 
117 
44 
7 
31 
8 
Group 
Rank 
1 
16 
3 
22 
17 
2 
33-
12 
6 
8 
9 
23 
21 
31 
32 
5 
25 
13 
14 
7 
15 
18 
11 
10 
20 
29 
26 
30 
28 
27 
19 
24 
4 
5 
25 
6 
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1919 
Railroads Assets 
Boston and Maine R..J.l . $141,462.4 
Buff alo, Pittsburgh, and Rochester RR. 76,088.9 
Canadian Northern RR. System 592,173.4 
Canadian Pacific RR. Co. 1,055,273.5 
Chesapeake and Ohio R~ . 365,895.1 
Chicago and Alton RR. Co. 148,745.3 
Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy 610,734.3 
RR. Co. 
Chicago and Eastern Illinois IL~. 
Chicago and Great Western RR. Co. 
Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul RR. 
Chicago and Northvrestern RR . Co. 
Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific RR. 
Delaware and Hudson Co. 
Delavvare, Lackawanna, & Western m?.. 
Denver and Rio-Grande RR . 
Erie RR . Co. 
Great Northern RR .• Co. 
Illinois Central RR . Co. 
Kansas City, Mexico, & Orient RR. Co. 
Kansas City Southern RR . Co. 
Lehigh Valley RR . Co. 
Los Angeles and Salt Lake RR •. 
Mi nneapolis and St. Louis RR . Co. 
:Missouri, Kansas, 8c Texas HR. Co. 
Mi ssouri Pacific RR . Co. 
New· York Central RR . Co. 
Nevv York, Chicago, & St. Louis RR. 
Nev:r York, New Haven, and Hartford 
RR . Co. 
Norfol k and ·\·estern RR . Co. 
Northern Pacific RR . Co. 
Northwestern Pacific RR. Co. 
Pennsylvania Co. 
Pennsylvania R~. Co. 
Pere Marquette P~. Co. 
Reading RR . Co. 
Seaboard Airlines Ry. Co. 
Southern Pacific Co. 
Southern P.R . Co. 
Spokane, Portland & Seattle RR. Go. 
St. Louis & San Fran.cisco Co. 
124,955.8 
141,559.2 
718,053.5 
489,506.7 
414,293.7 
161,014.1 
178,697-7 
283,102.3 
577,516.3 
803,836.0 
461,477.8 
81,924.4 
116,256.9 
222 , 341.9 
98,962.8 
79, 898 .7 
216,311.3 
421,189.9 
1,217,078.5 
80,900.3 
526,888 .4 
3LJ, 75o.1 
743,586.6 
71,828.1 
299,291.7 
1,469,345.7 
127,150.0 
319,6o4.2 
223,1LJ+.8 
832,534.7 
566,499.1 
138,250.7 
358.013.1 
Total 
Rank 
66 
145 
14 
5 
25 
61 
13 
81 
65 
12 
18 
22 
55 
5o 
34 
15 
10 
19 
136 
89 
42 
108 
139 
45 
21 
4 
137 
17 
27 
11 
150 
30 
2 
78 
28 
41 
9 
16 
68 
26 
Group 
Rank 
36 
49 
12 
3 
20 
34 
11 
40 
35 
10 
16 
19 
32 
31 
26 
13 
8 
17 
46 
41 
29 
44 
48 
30 
18 
2 
47 
15 
22. 
9 
5o 
24 
l 
39 
23 
28 
7 
14 
37 
21 
75-
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1919 
Total Group 
Railroads Assets Rank Rank 
--
8-'-uo Louis, Southwestern RR. Co . ~~113, 870.2 91 43 
Texas and Pacific R~ . Co. 131,135.2 70 38 
Union Pacific RR. Co. 98o, 763.4 6 ~-
Wabash RR. Co . 230,765.4 39 27 
'V'lestern Maryland RR. Co. 148,782.3 58 33 
Vtfestern Pacific R.R. Co. 115,493.1 90 42 
Tvneeling and IP.ke Erie P.R. Co. 88,198.7 12L~ 45 
1929 
Industrials 
Allied Chemical and ~Je Corp. ~~366,616 .8 61 18 
Aluminum Corp. of .ll~nerica . 217,531.1 112 38 
.American Can Co. 183,2-62.4 133 46 
American Radiator & Standard 
Sanitary Corp . 187,596.9 127 44 
American Smelting & Refining Co. 233,021.0 101 33 
.tiunerican Sugar & Refining Co. 159,620.0 150 53 
American Tobacco Co. 221,205.7 ill 37 
A-naconda Copper !lliining Co. 505,683.1 40 10 
Armour and Co. 448,5~.9.5 49 15 
Bethlehem Steel Corp. 643,356.2 27 6 
Chile Copper Co. 170,521.2 141 5o 
Chrysler Corp. 226,845.3 106 34 
Creole Petroleum Corp. 206,332.6 118 42 
E. I. DuPont de N em ours and Co. 463,333.2 46 12 
Ford Motor Co. 688,909 .4 23 5 
General Electric Company 460,455.3 48 14 
General Motors Corp. 1,242,894.9 7 3 
Goodyear Tire·'.and Rubber Co. 210,786.6 115 39 
Gulf Oil Corp. of Pennsylvania 614,140 . 7 28 7 
International Harvester Co . 346,120 .5 66 20 
International Mercantile Marine Co. 161,434.5 lL18 52 
International Paper Co. 383,365.8 60 17 
International Paper & Power Co. 592,899.7 34 8 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp . 209,908.1 116 40 
Kennecott Copper Corp. 296,761.7 so 25 
Liggett & Myers 'I'obacco Co . 19o,L~90 .5 123 43o 
Pan~~erican Petroleum & 
Transportation Co. 256,300.0 89 27 
76. 
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Industrials 
Paramount Famous I;:tsky Corp. 
Phel ps Dodge Corp . 
Pittsburgh Coal Co . 
Prairie Oil and Gas Co. 
Pullman Co . 
Pullman, Inc. 
Pure Oil Co . 
Sears, Roebuck, and Co. 
Sinclair Consolidated Oil Carp. 
Singer Manufacturing Co. 
Standard Oil of California 
Standard Oil of Indiana 
Standard Oil of New Jersey 
Standard Oil of Nev·v York 
Swift and Co . 
Texas Corporation 
Tidew·ater Associates Oil Co. 
Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. 
Union Oil Co. of California 
United Fruit Co . 
U. S. Rubber Co. 
U. S . Steel Corporation 
Vacuum Oil Co. 
Western Electric Co. 
Westinghouse Electrical & N~g . Co. 
Youngstovm Sheet and Tube Co . 
Public Utilities 
Alabama Power Co. 
A.rnerican Elec. Co. & Water Works Inc. 
American Foreign Power Co., Inc . 
American Power and Light Co. 
American Superpower Corp. 
American Telephone & Telegraph Co . 
Appalachian Electric Power Co. 
Ass ociated Gas and Electric Co. 
Brooklyn & Manhattan Transit Corp. 
Buff alo, Niagara, & Eastern 
Pm;rer Corp. 
Cities Service Co . 
1929 
Assets 
~n1o ,631 . 7 
237,214.6 
161,858.3 
180,066.1 
300,483.8 
305,529.8 
237,247.5 
209,282.2 
401,958.1 
l 8o,912 .4 
589,989.6 
498,371.6 
1,572,267.6 
695,385.8 
347,596.7 
461,818.4 
249,379.6 
281,510.4 
342, 242:·.4 
22:5,482.6 
343,131.4 
2,422,030.2 
186,864.1 
251,730.9 
233,690.1 
221,748.3 
~~172' 320.5 
385,951.6 
414,895.1 
699,087.0 
2L~5, lL6 .9 
3,826,683 .;6 
185,684 .0 
318,514.5 
278,354.8 
221,386.5 
913,592.4 
Total 
Rank 
lL~o 
99 
147 
135 
79 
78 
98 
117 
56 
134 
35 
42 
5 
22 
65 
47 
93 
84 
69 
JD7 
67 
2 
128 
92 
100 
109 
139 
58 
53 
20 
94 
l 
129 
75 
85 
110 
13 
Group 
Rank 
49 
31 
51 
48 
24 
23 
30 
41 
16 
47 
9 
11 
2 
4 
19 
13 
29 
26 
22. 
35 
21 
1 
45 
28 
32 
36 
51 
20 
16 
7 
33· 
1 
45 
28 
31 
40 
4 
77-
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Public Utilities 
Col~mbia Gas & Electric Corp. 
Co~~onwealth Edison Co. 
Commonwealth Power Corp. 
Commonwealth & Southern Corp. 
Consolidated Gas Co. of New York 
Consumers' Power Co. 
Detroit Edison Co. 
Duke Power Co. 
Electric Bond and. Share Co. 
Engineers Public Service Co. 
Federal Water Service Corp. 
General Gas and Electric Corp. 
Georgia Power Co. 
Illinois Pmver and Light Corp. 
Interborough 'Rapid Transit Co. 
International Hydroelectric System 
D1ternational Telephone & 
Telegraph Corp. 
Middle West Utilities Co. 
National Electric Power Co. 
N~tional Public Service Corp. 
New England. Power Associated 
Nmv York Rapid Transit Corp. 
North America Co. 
North America Light & Power Co. 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 
Pacific Lighting Corp. 
Pennsylvania-Ohio Edison Co. 
Pennsylvania Power and Light Corp. 
People's Gas, Light, & Coke Co. 
Philadelphia Electric Co. 
Public Service Corp. of New Jersey 
Public Service Corp. of 
Northern Illinois 
Rochester Central Power Corp. 
South East Power and Light Co. 
Southern California Edison Co. 
Standard Gas and Electric Co. 
United Corporation 
United Gas Improvement Co. 
United Light and Power Co. 
Assets 
$613,499.3 
342,483.9 
349,745.0 
737,312.1 
1,o8o, 740.5 
161,903.0 
259~238.4 
192,917~9 
681,965.2 
323,568.9 
165,304.0 
184,120.8 
228,398.3 
229,572.4 
435,oo5.5 
358,624.0 
389,914.3 
184,592.9 
407,714.5 
199,081;;8 
237,373.8 
172,653.8 
841,2·77 .5 
289,251.5 
413,918.1 
227,265.9 
162,177.2 
188,196.4 
188,160.5 
295,514.8 
600,348.4 
173,114.8 
184,292.0 
530,383.9 
336,816.7 
1,054,363.8 
221,792.6 
681,980.9 
500,022.3 
Total 
Rank 
29 
68 
64 
19 
10 
146 
88 
122 
26 
73 
143 
132 
104 
103 
51 
62 
57 
130 
55 
119 
97 
138 
16 
83 
54 
105 
144 
125 
126 
81 
32 
137 
131 
38 
72 
11 
108 
25 
41 
Group 
Rank 
10 
24 
23 
6 
2 
54 
32 
42: 
9 
26 
52 
48 
37 
36 
JJ+ 
21 
19 
46 
18 
41 
35 
5o 
5 
30 
17 
38 
53 
4J; 
44 
29 
11 
49 
47 
12 
25 
3 
39 
8 
13 
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Public Utilities 
United Light and Rys. Co. 
Ut ilities Power and Light Corp. 
'!;Yes tern PeP_nsyl vania Electric Co. 
Western Union Telegraph Co . 
Railroads 
Alleghany Corporation 
Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Ry. Co. 
Atlantic Coast Line RR. Co. 
Baltimore and Ohio RR. Co. 
Boston and Maine RR. Co. 
Central RR. Co. of Nffi"'" Jersey 
Chesapeake and Ohio Ry . Co. 
Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy RR. 
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul 
and Pacific RR. Co. 
Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co. 
CPicago, Rock Island, and 
Pacific Ry. Co. 
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago, 
and St . Louis Ry. Co. 
Cuba C ompa:ny 
Delaware and Hudson Co. 
Delaware Lackawanna, and 
V'lestern RR . Co. 
Denver and Rio Grande iVestern 
RR. Co. 
Erie RR . Co. 
Great Northern Ry. Co. 
Illinois Central RR . Co. 
Lehigh Valley RR . Co . 
Louisville and Nashville RR . Co . 
Michigan Central R.R. . Co. 
Missouri, Kansas, and Texas RR. Co. 
Missouri Pacific RR. Co. 
N~v York Central RR . Co. 
Nevv York, Chicago, and St. Louis 
RR. Co. 
New York, Nff~ Haven, and 
Hartford R...R. . Co. 
1929 
Assets 
$431,289.4 
322,237.7 
238,120.9 
350,424.4 
$ 196,167.1 
1,186,049.0 
384,933.6 
1,043,439.1 
268,193.2 
215,415.1 
493,064.7 
696,814.2 
770,793.9 
607,313.0 
493,245.8 
340,829.8 
161,951.0 
193,758.0 
214,064.4 
232,638.2 
582,361.1 
848,865.6 
745,342.6 
253,985.1 
534,201.5 
244,275.5 
315,932.3 
597,680.3 
1,484,960.4 
253,664.1 
603, 373.3 
Total 
Rank 
52 
74 
96 
63 
120 
9 
59 
12 
86 
113 
47 
21 
17 
30 
43 
71 
145 
121 
114 
102 
36 
15 
18 
90 
37 
95 
76 
33 
6 
91 
31 
Group 
Rank 
15 
27 
34 
22: 
37 
5 
2-3 
6 
29 
35 
20 
11 
9 
13 
19 
25 
42 
38 
36 
34 
16 
8 
10 
31 
17 
33 
26 
15 
3 
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Railroads 
Norfolk and Western Ry. Co. 
North~~n Pacif ic Ry. Co. 
Pefl_T1sy 1 vania Co . 
Pennsylvania RR. Co. 
Pere Marquette Ry. Co. 
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago, 
and St. Louis RR . Co. 
Reading Co. 
Seaboard -~rline Ry . Co. 
Southern Pacific Co. 
Southern Ry. Co. 
St . Lams, San Francisco Ry. Co. 
Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. 
Union Pacific RR . Co. 
ViTginia Ry. Co. 
Wabash Ry. Co. 
Western Maryland Ry. Co . 
Industrials 
1Ulied Chemical and Dye Corp. 
lUUIP.inum Co . of America 
America Tobacco Co. 
Anaconda Copper 1Jining Co. 
Armour Co. (Delaware) 
1\\;cmour Co. (Illinois) 
Atlantic Refifling Co. 
Beth~ehem Steel Corp. 
Chrysler Corp . 
Cities Service Oil Co. of Delaware 
Consolidated Oil Corp. 
E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co . 
Eastern Gas ~~d Fuel Associates 
Ford 1,.1:otor Co . 
F . w. ·woolworth Co. 
General Electric Co. 
General Motors Acceptance Corp. 
General Motors Corp. 
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. 
Great A&P Tea Co . of America 
1929 
Assets 
$515,658.5 
853,681.9 
260,624.9 
1,988.,762 .4 
173,768.5 
306,904.6 
444,810 . 8 
292,723.1 
2,243,378.5 
683,466.4 
478,4.03.8 
189,346.0 
1,203,714.9 
159,949.9 
341,122.1 
167,7h4.8 
1939 
$396,801.9 
253,010.6 
276,664.0 
582,257.8 
204,932. 9 
307,009.5 
199,058.4 
699,Lt.74 .o 
212,046. 9 
247,437 .4 
362,145 .4 
810,543 . 6 
22~7' 954.8 
673,496 .3 
229,627.8 
374,465.2 
426,873.3 
1,598,012 .2 
190,778.3 
184,620 .9 
Total 
Rank 
39 
14 
87 
4 
136 
77 
5o 
82: 
3 
24 
45 
124 
8 
149 . 
70 
142 
67 
106 
99 
46 
129 
88 
135 
32 
124 
108 
75 
24. 
113 
38 
112 
71 
62 
6 
144 
145 
Group 
Rank 
18 
7 
30 
2 
40 
27 
22: 
28 
1 
12 
21 
39 
4 
43 
24 
41 
15 
28 
25 
ll 
41 
21 
44 
7 
38 
29 
17 
5 
32 
8 
31 
16 
13 
3 
46 
47 
Bo. 
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1939 
Industrials 
Gu~f Oil Corp. 
International Harvester Co. 
International Paper Go. 
International Paper and Power Go. 
Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp. 
Ken~ecott Copper Corp. 
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Gorp. 
Montgomery Ward and Co., Inc. 
National Dairy Products Corp. 
National Steel Corp. 
Phelps Dodge Corp. 
Phi.llips Petroleum Co. 
Pullman Co. 
Pullman, Inc. 
Republic Steel Corp. 
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 
Sears, Roebuck, and Co. 
Socony-Vacuu~ Oil Co., Inc. 
Standard Oil Co. of California 
Standard Oil Co. of Indiana 
Standard Oil Co. of Nmv Jersey 
Swift and Co. 
Texas Corp. 
Tidmvater Associated Oil Co. 
Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. 
United Fruit Co. 
U. S. Steel Corp. 
Western Electric Co. 
Westinghouse Electric & 
Manufactm~ing Co. 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
Public Utili ties 
Alabama Povrer Co. 
American and Foreign Power 
Co., Inc. 
American Gas and Electric Co. 
American Power & Light Co. 
American Telephone & 
Telegraph Co. 
Assets 
~~5L,.6, 870.6 
4o6,62L,.8 
220,744.3 
221,549.5 
227,653.9 
342;743.3 
184,302.8 . 
227' 831.0 
199,724.7 
207' 11!.4.9 
194,226.8 
226,742.4 
306,199.5 
254,764.1 
348,715.5 
181,605_. 7 
28Lf,o84.6 
923,438.9 
6o5, 137.6 
724,663.1 
2,553,193.6 
306,454.5 
6o5,360.6 
202,758.5 
309,233.9 
183,770.8 
1,711,279.0 
275,946.6 
207,560.2 
241,719.7 
$199,159.9 
753,668.0 
522,009.5 
828,116.5 
5,119,062.9 
Total 
Rank 
51 
64 
120 
119 
115 
79 
146 
114 
132 
127 
142: 
116 
90 
104 
77 
150 
95 
17 
42 
30 
2 
89 
41 
130 
86 
147 
5 
100 
126 
110 
134 
28 
55 
21 
1 
Group 
Rank 
12 
14 
37 
36 
3~-
19 
48 
3.33 
43 
40 
45 
35 
23 
27 
18 
5o 
24 
4 
10 
6 
1 
22 
9 
42 
20 
49 
2 
26 
39 
30 
51 
14 
24 
1D 
1 
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Public Utili ties 
American Vlater iforks and 
Electric Co., Inc. 
~ssociated Electric Co. 
Associated Gas & Electric Co. 
Associated Gas & Electric Corp. 
Bell Telephone Co. 
of Pennsylvania 
Boston Edison Co. 
Brooklyn Edison Co., Inc. 
Brookl;yn, :Manhattan 
Transit Corp. 
Bu:f:falo, :Hiagara, & Eastern 
Power Corp. 
Cities Service Co. 
Columbia Gas & Electric Co. 
Commonwealth Edison Co. 
Commonwealth & Southern Corp. 
Consolidated Edison Co. of 
New· York, Inc. 
Consumers' Power Co. 
Detroit Edison Co. 
Duke Power Co. 
Electric Bond & Share Co. 
Electric Power & Light Corp. 
Engineers Public Service Co. 
Federal Water Service Corp. 
General Gas & Electric Corp. 
Georgia l")mver Co. 
Illinois Bell Telephone Co. 
Illinois-Iowa Power Co. 
International Hydro Electric System 
D1ternational Telephone & 
Telegraph Corp. 
Lehigh Power Securities Corp. 
Michigan Bell Telephone Co. 
Middle West Corp. 
National Power & Light Co. 
New England Power Association 
New England Telephone & 
Telegraph Co. 
New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. 
New York, Pe~~sylvania, 
New Jersey Utilities Co. 
New York Telephone Co. 
1939 
Assets 
~~399,.501.6 
182,.524.7 
1,046,177·4 
1,040,188.8 
341,289.6 
183,.574.7 
2.5.5,.571.2 
33h,688.o 
243,.58.5.0 
l,oso,o68. 7 
430,8.53.9 
824,348.4 
1,213,866.4 
1,358,558.5 
270,.506.8 
348,934.0 
221,.583.7 
5.5.5,766.0 
719,307.8 
373,427.6 
191,889.3 
241,2~1.6 
280,612.7 
339,684.3 
19.5,870.5 
582,922.2 
.537 ,280 • .5 
322,091.0 
197,33:5.0 
448,226.2 
.582,370.0 
413,73.5.5 
347,548.9 
22.5,291 • .5 
.598,282.7 
88o, 704.7 
Total 
Rank 
66 
149 
13 
14 
80 
148 
103 
83 
109 
12 
61 
22 
10 
7 
101 
76 
118 
49 
31 
72 
143 
111 
97 
82 
139 
44· 
53 
8.5 
138 
6o 
45 
63 
78 
117 
43 
18 
Group 
Rank 
30 
58 
5 
6 
36 
57 
44 
38 
45 
4 
27 
11 
3 
2 
43 
34 
48 
22 
15 
33-
56 
46 
41 
37 
55 
19 
23 
39 
54 
26 
20 
28 
35 
47 
18 
8 
82. 
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Public Utilities 
Niagara Hudson Power Corp. 
North 1\\.merican Co. 
0Pio Bell Telephone Co. 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 
Pacific Lighting Corp. 
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co . 
People t s Gas Light & Coke Co. 
Public Service Corp. of 
NevY Jersey 
Southern California Edison Co. Ltd. 
Southern California Telephone Co. 
Soutlnvestern Bell Telephone Co. 
Standard Gas & Electric Co. 
United Gas Corp. 
United Gas Improvement Co. 
United Light & Power Co. 
Western Pennsylvania Electric Co. 
Western Union Telegraph Co . 
Railroads 
Alleghany Corporation 
Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe RR . 
Atlantic Coast Line RR. Co. 
Baltimore & Ohio RR . Co. 
Boston & Maine RR. Co. 
Central Pacific Ry. Co. 
Central P~ . Co. of New Jers~ 
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. 
Chicago, Burlington, & 
Quincy R.."R.. Co. 
Chicago, lifd. lwaukee, St. Paul, 
& Paci f ic RR . Co. 
Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. 
Chicago, Rock Island, Pacific Ry . 
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago, 
& St . Louis Ry. Co. 
Delaware, Lackawanna, & 
Vvestern RR. Co. 
Denver & Rio Grande Western RR . 
Erie RR . Co. 
Great Northern Ry . Co. 
Illinois Central R.."R.. Co. 
1939 
Assets 
$610,127 .9 
931,567.7 
199,250.8 
764,251.5 
219' 41.,.6 .4 
510,219 .7 
197,556.3 
686,820.9 
400,115.3 
198,543.7 
396,328.1 
766,81.6.6 
293,693.7 
837,616.4 
577,069 .5 
277,453.7 
375,558.4 
$195,826.5 
1,297,744.9 
369,734.6 
1,190, 120.7 
280,806.8 
378,470.7 
195,227.9 
743,623.7 
682,372.7 
757,966.8 
678,967.9 
493,633.1 
334,236.1 
213,550.l.t 
249,972.7 
542,459.3 
823,767.8 
698,884.8 
Total 
RaD.k 
40 
16 
133 
26 
122 
56 
137 
34 
65 
136 
68 
25 
92 
20 
48 
98 
70 
140 
8 
74 
11 
96 
69 
141 
29 
35 
27 
37 
57 
84 
123 
107 
52 
23 
33 
Group 
Rank 
17 
7 
5o 
13 
49 
25 
53 
16 
29 
52 
31 
12 
40 
9 
21 
42 
32 
41 
J 
25 
5 
32 
23 
42 
10 
12 
9 
14 
20 
27 
37 
35 
18 
8 
11 
83. 
APPENDIX A - The 150 Largest Corporations, 1909-1949, by Decades .• 
Railroads 
Lehigh Vall ey RR . Co. 
Louisville & Nashville RR . Co. 
Michigan Central RR . Co . 
Missouri, Kansas, Texas R."R . Co . 
Missouri Pacific RR . Co. 
New York Central RR . Co. 
Nev·r York, Chicago, & St. Louis 
RR . Co . 
Heiv York, Nevr Haven, & Hartford 
RR . Co. 
Norfolk and w·estern Ry. Co. 
Northern Pacific Ry. Co . 
Oregon Short Line RR. Co . 
Pennsylvania Co . 
Pem1sylvania RR . Co. 
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago, 
& St. Louis f[R . Co. 
Reading Co . 
Seaboard Airlines Ry. Co. 
Southern Pacific Co . 
Southern Pacific RR . Co. 
Southern Ry. Co . 
St . Louis & San Francisco Ry. 
Texas & New· Orleans RR . Co. 
Texas & Pacific Ry . Co . 
Union Pacific R.R . Co . 
Wabash Ry. Co. 
Industrials 
Allied Chemical & IFye Corp. 
All is- Chalmers Mfg . Co . 
Alluni.num Co . of .1\merica 
~merican Can Co. 
.iUnerican Cyanimid Co. 
.A..merican Smelting & Refining Co. 
American Tobacco Co . 
America Viscose Corp . 
Anaconda Copper Mining Co. 
1939 
1949 
A.ssets 
$219,839.5 
529,507.9 
199,835.8 
263,016.3. 
680, 619.4 
1,822,030.5 
289,646.9 
577,201.3 
552,100.5 
843,507.2 
205,874.4 
254,56o.5 
2,322,408.4 
308,878.9 
455,621.4 
300,533 .4 
1,2-82,935.6 
372,766 .0 
625,093 .0 
46l,W+.4 
286,511.8 
208,371.9 
1,036, 746.9 
340,920.4 
$338,6oo.6 
253, 890.3 
503, 606.3 
275, 843 .4 
212,036 .2 
290,417.5 
686,675.1 
226,865.9 
660,316.5 
Total 
Rank 
121 
54. 
131 
102 
36 
4 
93 
47 
5o 
19 
128 
105 
3 
87 
59 
91 
9 
73 
39 
58 
94 
125 
15 
81 
86 
127 
61 
113 
150 
104 
39 
139 
43 
Group 
RaP.k 
36 
19 
4o 
33 
13 
2 
30 
16 
17 
7 
39 
34 
1 
28 
22. 
2.9 
4 
24 
15 
21 
31 
38 
6 
26 
38 
63 
26 
54 
44 
49 
17 
69 
19 
84. 
APPENDIX A. - The 1.50 largest Corporations, 1909-1949, by Decades . 
1949 
Industrials 
Anderson, Clayton, and Co . 
(cotton by-products) 
Armour & Co. (Illinois) 
Armco Steel Corp. 
Atlantic Refining Co. 
Beth~ehem Steel Corp. 
Borden Co. 
Celanese Corp. of America 
Chrysler Corp. 
Continental Can Co . 
Continental Oil Co. 
Creole Petroleum Corp. 
Deere and Co. 
Dow Chemical Co. 
E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. 
Eastman Kodak Co. 
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. 
General Electric Co. 
General F'oods Corp. 
B. F. Goodrich Co. 
General Motors Corp. 
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. 
Great A&P Tea Co. of America 
Gulf Oil Co. 
Humble Oil and Refining Co. 
Inland Steel Co. 
International Business Machine Corp. 
International Harvester Co. 
International Paper Co. 
J. c. Penney Co. 
Jones and laughlin Steel Co~. 
Kennecott Copper Corp. 
U ggett & Myers Tobacco Co . 
Loew 1 s, Inc. 
Montgomery Ward and Co. 
National Dairy Products Corp. 
National Distillers Products Corp. 
National Steel Corp. 
Phelps Dodge Corp . 
Phillips Petroleum Co. 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. 
Procter and Gamble Co. 
Assets 
~~28L~, 331.0 
' 447' 702.2 
316,204.0 
382,.5.57.6 
1,029,000.2 
242,239.3 
2.56,6.51.3 
387,364.7 
221,71.5.3 
261,949.8 
618,977.5 
2.57,560.1 
271,473.4 
1,189,345.4 
411,632.4 
34L~,394.4 
1,177,391.6 
22:.5,425. 7 
261,73.5.8 
2,957,769.6 
424,9.54.8 
322,849.0 
1,191,004.1 
861,426 .3 
292,821.7 
241,967.8 
671,844.0 
323,240.7 
264,736.4 
379,117.4 
57.5,419.7 
425,042.0 
223,141.6 
578,874.9 
317,641.7 
214,563.0 
329,884.3 
274,3.58.6 
579,273.5 
227,318.8 
316,387.6 
Total 
Rank 
108 
66 
9.5 
78 
22 
132-
126 
76 
142 
121 
46 
125 
11.5 
16 
71 
84 
19 
1lJD 
122 
2 
70 
90 
1.5 
2.5 
103 
133 
41 
89 
117 
79 
51 
69 
141 
.5o 
92 
147 
88 
114 
49 
138 
94 
Group 
Rank 
51 
28 
45 
33 
11 
65 
62 
32 
72 
59 
20 
61 
.56 
7 
31 
36 
9 
70 
60 
1 
30 
41 
6 
12 
48 
66 
18 
4o 
58 
84 
23 
29 
71 
22 
4J 
73 
39 
55 
21 
68 
44 
85. 
AFPEJ,IDIX A - The 150 Largest Corporations, 1909-1949, by Decades. 
Industrials 
Pure Oil Co. 
Radio Corp. of America 
Republic Steel Corp. 
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 
Schenley Industries, Inc. 
Sears, Roebuck, and Co. 
Sinclair Oil Corp. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. 
Standard Oil Co. of California 
Standard Oil Co. of Indiana 
Standard Oil Co. of Nmv Jersey 
Standard Oil Co. (Ohio) 
Sun Oil Co. 
Swift and Co. 
Texas Co. 
Tidffi'rater Associated Oil Co. 
Union Carbon and Carbide Corp. 
Union Oil Co. of California 
United Fruit Co. 
United States Rubber Co. 
United States Steel Corp. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp. 
F . W. Woolworth Co. 
You..11gstmm Sheet and Tube Co. 
Public Utilities 
Alabama Power Co. 
American and Foreign Power 
Co., Inc. 
American Gas and Electric Co. 
American Natural Gas Co. 
American Telephone and 
Telegraph Co. 
Boston Edison Co. 
Central and Southwestern Corp. 
Cities Service Co. 
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. 
Colu..mbia Gas System Inc. 
Assets 
$270,967.9 
248,224.5 
489,086.4 
530,698.1 
28o,007 .9 
789,283.2 
710,125.2 
1,443,034.0 
1,074,725.7 
1,5oo,ol.~9.5 
1,184,488.4 
237,389.5 
278,582.6 
522,504.9 
1,277,093.8 
287,730.0 
722,692.5 
298,415.9 
319,682.0 
348,500.2 
2,534,971.8 
693,636.8 
31..~2,285.1 
3ll,677 .4. 
$221,646.5 
808,656.6 
712,962.3 
236,134.4 
10,000,683 .o 
258,645.0 
282,700.6 
991,851.3 
249,957.6 
480,191.7 
Total 
Rank 
116 
129 
63 
56 
110 
· 30 
35 
9 
20 
7 
18 
134 
111 
57 
12 
106 
33 
102 
91 
83 
3 
37 
85 
96 
29 
34 
135 
1 
124 
109 
24 
128 
64 
Group 
Rank 
57 
64 
27 
24 
52 
13 
15 
4 
10 
3 
8 
67 
53 
25 
5 
5o 
14 
47 
42 
35: 
2 
16 
37 
l~6 
41 
8 
10 
39 
1 
35 
33~-
7 
36 
20 
86. 
APPENDIX A - The 150 L:l.rgest Corporations, 1909-1949, by Decades. 
Public Utilities 
Commonwealth Edison Co. 
Commonwealth and Southern Corp. 
Consolidated Edison Co. 
of Nevf York 
Consolidated Gas, Electric 
Light and Power Co. 
Consolidated Natural Gas 
Consumers' Power Co. 
Detroit Edison Co. 
Duke Power Co. 
General Public Utilities Corp. 
General Telephone Corp. 
Georgia Power Co. 
International Telephone & 
Telegraph Corp. 
Niddle Southern Utilities Inc. 
New England Electric System 
Niagara Hudson Power Corp. 
North American Co. 
Northern States Power Co. 
Pacific Gas and Electric Co. 
Pacific Lighting Corp. 
Pennsylvania Power & Light 
People ' s Gas Light & Coke 
Philadelphia Electric Co. 
Public Service Electric & Gas Co. 
Southern California Edison Co. 
Southern Califor nia Gas Co. 
Southern Co. 
Standard Gas and Electric Co. 
United Gas Corp. 
United Light and Rys. Co . 
Virginia Electric & Power Co. 
Western Union Telegraph Co. 
Wisconsin Electric Power Co. 
Assets 
$1,042,714.8 
1,384,551.5 
1,448,6?6.9 
247,008.4 
350,071.4 
395,610.3 
489,333.6 
289,261.7 
751,943.9 
220,714.3 
277,291.5 
540,233.4 
368,813.3 
466,473.1 
624,983.7 
513,185.3 
310,56o.3 
1,209,736.6 
334,878. 3 
316,660.1 
214,426.6 
607' 909.4 
678,612.5 
557,855.6 
233,176.9 
547,835.1 
573,941.8 
388,530.3 
358,890.0 
212,297.2 
286,619.8 
242,257.2 
Total 
Rank 
21 
lO 
8 
130 
82 
74 
62 
105 
31 
145 
1J2 
55 
80 
65 
45 
59 
97 
14 
87 
93 
148 
47 
4o 
53 
137 
54 
52 
75 
81 
149 
107 
131 
Group 
Rank 
5 
3 
2 
37 
26 
22 
19 
31 
9 
42 
3!~ 
17 
24 
21 
12 
18 
28 
4 
29 
2-7 
43 
13 
11 
15 
40 
16 
14 
23 
2._5 
44 
32 
38 
APPEl'IDIX A - The 150 Largest Corporations, 1909-1949, by Decades. 
Railroads 
Atchison, Topeka, and 
Santa Fe Ry. Co . 
Atlantic Coast Line RR . Co. 
Baltimore and Ohio PB. Co. 
Boston & Maine RR. Co . 
Chesapeake and Ohio Ry . Co. 
Chicago, Burlington, and 
Quincy RR . Co. 
Chicago, Milwaukee, St . Paul, 
and Pacific RR . Co . 
Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co . 
Chicago, Rock Island, and 
Pacific RR . Co. 
Delaware, Lackawanna, and 
Western RR . Co . 
Erie I?.R . Co. 
Great Northern Ry. Co. 
Illinois Central RR . Co . 
Louisville and Nashville RR . Co . 
Missouri-Kansas-Texas I?.R. Co. 
Missouri Pacific RR . Co . 
Nmv York Central I?.R . Co. 
New York, Chicago, & 
St . Louis R..'li. . Co . 
New· York, Nevv Haven, and 
Hartford R.B. . 
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. 
Northern Pacific Ry . Co. 
Pennsylvania Co . 
PeP..nsylvania Co . 
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago 
& St • Louis I?.R. Co . 
Reading Co. 
Seaboard Airlines Ry. Co . 
Southern Pacific Co. 
Southern Ry. Co. 
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co . 
Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. 
Union Pacific RR . Co. 
Wabash R.."R. . Co. 
1949 
A.ssets 
$1,293,415.4 
383,927.1 
1, 234,236.9 
263,471.9 
817,619.3 
694,991.7 
663,374.3 
509,297-9 
411,124 .6 
300,591.8 
42'6,511.6 
818,843.0 
640,551.2 
513,256.1 
263,304.4 
726,015.0 
1,754,249.1 
304,779.5 
427,-648.0 
586,347 . L~ 
834,316.3 
220,895-7 
2,304,578.8 
260,944.7 
401,776.8 
262,326.0 
1,803,259.4 
688,975.8 
303,332 .9 
218,392.5 
1,187,405.1 
233,2:35.1 
-j~- * -;s- * 
Total 
Rank 
11 
77 
13 
118 
28 
36 
42 
60 
72 
100 
68 
27 
44 
58 
119 
32 
6 
98 
67 
48 
26 
144 
4 
123 
73 
120 
5 
38 
99 
146 
17 
136 
Group 
Rank 
4 
22 
5 
26 
9 
11 
13 
17 
20 
25 
19 
8 
14 
16 
27 
10 
3 
23 
18 
15 
7 
31 
1 " 
29 
21 
28 
2_ 
12 
24 
32 
6 
30 
88. 
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